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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether rental yields in the housing market 
exhibit cross sectional variation, and if such variation does exist, what is causing it. Our 
hypothesis  is  that  net  rental  yield  declines  as  asset  prices  increase,  a  violation  of  the  no  
arbitrage condition and thus, of the efficient markets hypothesis. Though this phenomenon 
has previously been documented, it has not been analyzed from an investments 
perspective. Therefore, we attempt to open up discussion on the causes and implications 
of cross-sectional variation of rental yields. 
DATA  
The main data in this study comprises of the Oikotie housing advertisement database, a 
large Finnish online home brokerage. The dataset includes all the data that advertisers 
enter when advertising a dwelling for sale or for rent. The data set covers a time period 
that begins in January 2002 and ends in September 2009 and after a process of matching 
advertisements of dwelling for rent to for sale advertisements, includes altogether 31,864 
dwellings or dwelling pairs with data on both asking rent and sales price as well as several 
other dwelling-specific characteristics. Additional data has been gathered from the 
Statistics Finland database, the Helsinki Urban Facts database and the Google Maps 
service. 
RESULTS  
The  results  indicate  that  cross-sectional  variation  of  rental  yield  exists  and  that  it  is  
strongly negative relationship with asset value. Thus it seems dwelling prices and rents are 
not considered simultaneously with a set rental yield in mind, but rather through separate 
processes. The difference in yields is economically significant, as the mean yield of the 
highest and lowest decile differ by up to 4 %.  
In our regression analyses of net rental yields, we find statistically significant coefficients 
for variables reflecting dwelling size, age, type, location and many other factors, while 
controlling for time and macro-level factors such as unemployment and average income in 
the area. Although most of these coefficients are intuitive when considering rents and 
prices separately, the fact that net rental yield varies so greatly within a single market 
means that opportunities for profitable investment strategies exist, and are accessible even 
by using rather simple rules of thumb. 
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TAVOITTEET 
Tämän tutkielman tavoitteena on tutkia vaihtelevatko vuokratuotot asuntomarkkinan 
sisällä, ja jos tälläistä vaihtelua esiintyy, mitkä tekijät sitä aiheuttavat. Hypoteesinamme 
on, että nettovuokratuotto on matalampi kalliimmille asunnoille, mikä on vastoin 
tehokkaiden markkinoiden olettamaa sen heikossakin muodossa. Vaikka tuottojen vaihtelu 
on havaittu aiemmissakin tutkimuksissa, sitä ei ole aikaisemmin analysoitu 
sijoitusperspektiivistä. Pyrimme tällä tutkielmalla avaamaan keskustelua vuokratuottojen 
vaihtelusta asuntomarkkinoiden sisällä, sekä tämän vaihtelun syistä ja seuraamuksista. 
AINEISTO 
Keskeisin tutkimuksessa käytetty aineisto on Oikotie-internetportaalin asuntojen myynti- 
ja vuokrailmoitukset. Oikotie on suuri suomalainen asuntojen välityspalvelu Internetissä. 
Aineistoon kuuluu kaikki tiedot, jotka ilmoittaja syöttää palveluun ilmoitusta jättäessään, 
ja aineisto kattaa ajanjakson tammikuu 2002 – syyskuu 2009. Tästä aineistosta on etsitty 
ja yhteensovitettu yhteensä 31 864 ilmoitusparia, joissa vuokra- ja myynti-ilmoituksen 
kohde on ollut joko sama asunto tai toisiaan hyvin läheisesti vastaavat asunnot. Oikotien 
lisäksi aineistoa on kerätty Tilastokeskuksen sekä Helsingin kaupungin tietokeskuksen 
tietokannoista sekä Google Kartat –palvelusta. 
TULOKSET 
Tulokset osoittavat, että asuntomarkkinoiden sisällä esiintyy vuokratuottojen vaihtelua ja, 
että vuokratuotto laskee voimakkaasti kalliimpien asuntojen kohdalla. Tulokset viittaavat 
siihen, että asuntojen pyyntivuokria ja –hintoja ei harkita yhtä aikaa sopiva vuokratuotto 
huomioiden, vaan että molemmille on erilliset hinnoittelumenetelmänsä. Tuottoero on 
taloudellisesti merkittävä: ylimmän ja alimman hintakymmenyksen välinen 
vuokratuottoero on jopa 4 %. 
Vuokratuotolle tehdyn regressioanalyysin avulla havaitaan, että asunnon koko, ikä, 
talotyyppi, sijainti ja moni muu tekijä ovat tilastollisesti merkitseviä vuokratuoton 
määrittäjiä. Analyysissä kontrolloidaan lisäksi ilmoituksen ajankohta sekä useita alue-
tason muuttujia, kuten alueen työttömyys ja keskitulot. Vaikka useat näistä tekijöistä 
onkin helppo ymmärtää, kun vuokraa ja hintaa käsitellään toisistaan erillisinä muuttujina, 
vuokratuottojen voimakas vaihtelu alueellisesti suppeankin markkinan puitteissa 
tarkoittaa, että kannattavia sijoitusstrategioita on mahdollista löytää, vieläpä hyvin 
yksinkertaisia nyrkkisääntöjä käyttämällä. 
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1 Introduction 
Housing makes up a large part of global investment assets (66 % of Finnish investment assets 
and nearly two thirds in the US). Despite this, the field has received only limited attention 
from academic researchers. Traditional finance research focuses very strongly on securities 
markets where the availability of data is good and events are plentiful. Because housing 
assets, in addition to being investment assets, are also consumer durables, comparisons such 
as the one done above may not be completely relevant, but developing a better understanding 
of the investment landscape in housing markets is necessary to be able to understand the 
investment decisions faced by the majority of individuals. Therefore, we turn our attention to 
investing in the housing market. 
Early equilibrium models of house prices have focused on a spatial equilibrium, pricing 
houses relative to their location from, e.g., the city center, services, central business districts, 
etc. (Muth 1961).  These models are, however very imprecise, as the amount of factors to be 
considered is overwhelming. After spatial equilibrium, hedonic models emerged as the more 
developed versions of these purely spatial models (Lancaster 1966) where structural, 
neighborhood, location, contractual and temporal characteristics are used to determine house 
values. Still, the problems related to measurability of the factors remained. 
Much of academic research in housing (see, e.g., Case and Shiller (1987, 1989)) uses a typical 
financial no-arbitrage condition, which stems from the capital asset pricing model. According 
to this condition, investors earn equal risk-adjusted returns from investing in the housing 
market or other markets. In this approach, housing is expected to return a flow of housing 
services, and its value can be calculated by discounting. However, one of its major problems 
concerns  the  issue  of  risk  aversion.  As  stated  earlier,  a  typical  home  owner’s  investment  
portfolio is quite undiversified, therefore it is difficult to assess whether the return is 
appropriate without knowledge of the individual’s risk premium on housing. 
Apart from the CAPM-based approach used by Case and Shiller, there exists another financial 
no-arbitrage condition, which states that there are no predictable excess returns to being an 
owner relative to being a renter (Poterba 1984). The rent-own decision is perceived mostly as 
a financial consideration, since the same level of housing services is received whether the 
housing unit is owned or rented. The main problem with this approach has been to ensure the 
comparability of the owned and rented housing, because rental units generally differ in terms 
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of size, location, building type and other possible factors. Unbiased data sets that are free of 
the quality-adjustment problems have been rarely obtained. 
This paper focuses on rent-own financial equilibrium and provides a fresh set of quality-
matched data for analysis. Past studies have focused on evaluating undervaluation or 
overvaluation of the whole market on the basis of aggregate rent and price levels.  (see.  e.g.  
Oikarinen, 2007) They claim that it is sensible to assume the rent-price ratio to vary between 
regions and metropolitan areas, and consider different expectations of price appreciation to be 
the main explaining factor for the variation. However, we feel it is worthwhile to delve further 
into this variation and analyze it in the context of differently priced and sized housing within 
the same metropolitan area. 
With new data of over 32,000 matched pairs of advertisements of owned and rented housing 
units, we attempt to overcome the aforementioned problem of comparability between rental 
and owned housing. By limiting arbitrage relationships to apply within the housing asset 
class,  we  attempt  to  neutralize  the  problem  of  risk  aversion  in  terms  of  owning  an  
undiversified portfolio. 
Our primary hypothesis is that even after ensuring comparability between the rented and 
owned housing units, the rent-price relationship will exhibit significant variation across the 
cross-section of housing and that it will have a negative relationship with ask price, our proxy 
for asset value. Secondly, we do not believe that differences in expected price appreciation 
can explain the variation, but that the phenomenon has other explanations as well, which 
mostly relate to variation in the structure of supply and demand as well as cost of capital.  
Earlier research of this phenomenon, other than on an aggregated scale, is very limited. Very 
recently, Garner & Verbrugge (2009), Tian (2008) and Hargreaves (2005) have began to 
examine the cross-sectional variance in the user costs of housing and rents and all have 
documented rental yields falling with price. Because these papers are written by scholars in 
the field of urban economics, their approach largely ignores analysis of whether the existence 
of the variation is consistent with the financial no-arbitrage relationship between renting and 
owning. From a financial economics perspective, it is a violation of the efficient market 
hypothesis if some parts of the market are more lucrative to own and in some parts it makes 
more sense to rent. We believe it is possible to examine this further, especially as the Finnish 
housing market and our data allow for a unique approach.  We take the financial economics 
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perspective in an attempt to invite further discussion in the field of arbitrage in the housing 
markets.  
Due to our financial economics approach, our results also have implications for housing 
market participants. Typical Finnish households have strong preference to invest in their own 
home and become owner-occupiers, and possibly neglect the financial considerations. Our 
study aims to offer insight for the tenure choice decision-making. Moreover, the same results 
are applicable for any housing investor aiming to optimize the return and risk on the 
investment. From a diversified investors’ perspective, the efficient market hypothesis is 
violated if one can engage in profitable asset-picking instead of passive investment strategies.  
For most investors in the Finnish market, cross-sectional variation in the residential rental 
yields is clearly an unchartered territory. 
Our primary conclusion is that there indeed exists a discrepancy between rents and prices. It 
seems that dwellings are often not priced according to their cash flow producing capability, 
that is, net rental yield, but rather, that the appropriate ask rent and price are set through 
separate processes. As hypothesized, net rental yield is a function of dwelling value, which 
falls as value increases. The phenomenon is economically significant as we find that the 
yields of the highest and lowest priced asset deciles differ by up to 4 %. The phenomenon 
holds even after controlling for dwelling types, size, geography and date as well as many 
other  factors  in  our  regression  analysis,  discussed  later.  As  hypothesized,  the  elasiticities  of  
price and rent to dwelling-specific characteristics in the hedonic pricing model differ, which 
causes the variation, but clearly violates the no arbitrage condition and thus, efficient markets 
hypothesis. 
This paper is structured as follows: the next section will provide background to the subject as 
well as broadly review relevant prior literature, theories and assumptions made as well as 
briefly describe the Finnish housing market. Section 3 will start by summarizing prior 
literature regarding methodology in hedonic models after which we will proceed to choose the 
functional form to be used in the quantitative analysis of this paper, as well as formulate our 
hypotheses. In section 4 we will describe the data used in this study as well as discuss some 
possible limitations that using the advertisement dataset imposes. In section 5 we will present 
the results of the regression analyses as well as further describe the data with several figure. 
Section 6 will provide a discussion of the results, our conclusions, their contribution and some 
suggestions for further research that can we done with similar approach data-wise. 
  4 
 
2 Background 
In this section, we broadly review the theory and assumptions behind the no arbitrage 
condition (NAC) model. We start by describing the dynamics of the housing market in a four-
quadrant model and then proceed to discuss the financial no arbitrage condition, which is one 
of the four key equilibriums in the market. Next we go through assumptions of the NAC 
model and related literature. We then move on to the determinants of housing prices, rents 
and net rental yield, and then discuss the efficiency of the housing market. The section closes 
with a brief description of the Finnish housing market and Finnish households’ preferences 
regarding housing consumption. 
2.1 Four equilibriums of the real estate market 
Since real estate is a durable good, its production and price are determined in an asset (or 
capital) market. In the real estate asset market, demand must equal supply. In the long run, the 
asset market should equate market prices with replacement costs that include building costs 
and land value. However, in the short run, the two may diverge significantly because of lags 
and delays that are inherent in the construction process. Generally, there are other 
determinants of asset demand besides the replacement cost of the assets. The most important 
determinant, as diPasquale and Wheaton (1996) point out, is the rental income that real estate 
assets earn. To understand rent, it is necessary to consider the market for the use of real estate, 
which can be referred to as the property market.   
In the market for the use of real estate space, demand is formed by occupiers of space.  In the 
residential market, which is the focus of this study, the occupiers of space are households that 
divide their income between the consumption of many commodities, one of which is space. 
Households are either tenants or owner-occupiers of residential space. For tenants, rent is 
simply specified in the rental agreement, and for owners, rent is defined as the annualized cost 
associated with ownership of property, i.e., the imputed rent or user cost. 
The asset market and the property market are linked by two junctions. Firstly, rent levels 
determined in the property market are central in determining the demand for real estate assets. 
After all, investors are really purchasing an income stream when they acquire an asset. Thus, 
changes in rent in the property market immediately affect the demand for ownership in the 
asset market. The second link between the two markets is the construction or development 
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sector. If construction increases and the supply of assets grows, not only are prices driven 
down in the asset market, but rents decline in the property market as well. These connections 
between the two markets are illustrated in the four-quadrant diagram adapted from 
DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996) in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: 
The four quadrant model 
The four quadrant model (diPasquale & Wheaton, 1996) represents how equilibriums are formed in the housing 
market on both the asset market and the property market. Our study focuses on the north-west quadrant of the 
model. 
 
Asset Market: 
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Asset Market:
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The southwest and southeast quadrants of Figure 1 represent how the asset and property 
markets deal with changes in construction. The northeast quadrant has two axes, rent (per unit 
of space) and the stock of space. The curve represents how the demand for space depends on 
rents, given the state of the economy. Inelastic demand for households would be depicted by a 
vertical curve and demand sensitive to rents a more horizontal curve. An upward or 
downward shift occurs through an increase in households or economic growth. 
This study is mostly interested in what is happening in the northwest quadrant. The first part 
of the asset market has two axes: rent and price. The ray from the origin represents the 
capitalization rate for real estate assets. This ratio is also known as the ratio of rent-to-price 
(or sometimes inversely as price-to-rent). This is the current yield that investors demand in 
order to hold real estate assets. Generally, four considerations make up this capitalization rate: 
the long-term interest rate in the economy, the expected growth in rents and prices, the risks 
associated with the rental income stream and price growth, and the treatment of real estate in 
the federal tax code. In the long run and considering a CAPM-type risk premium for the 
whole asset class, the capitalization rate can be assumed to be an exogenous variable used to 
determine a price P for rental level R. However, in the short run there are deviations from the 
long-run equilibrium capitalization rate. We will discuss the determinants of the capitalization 
rate (or rental yield) in the following sections.             
2.2 The basic financial no-arbitrage condition model 
The basic model of housing values, as proposed by Mills (1972), assumes that the housing 
market is perfectly competitive, which drives profits to be zero. Alternatively, gross returns to 
housing capital (income or implicit income) equal costs. This means that gross housing rents 
equal total costs of home ownership, which forms the basis of the NAC model, which will be 
discussed in this section. 
Total costs of home ownership include both operating costs and the expected capital gains, 
which are stated in the following equation: 
 ? = ?? +?? + ??? ? ??, (1) 
which can be rearranged to obtain 
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 ? = ?? +? + ?? ? ???, (2) 
where rent R is equal to the costs of ownership, which are an annual interest on the 
investment at rate i, expected capital gains at rate g, operating costs (maintenance, insurance, 
utilities) m and property taxes tp. 
For  a  house  value  of  P and the costs implied by i, m, tp and g, R is  the  rent  that  must  be  
charged to break even (earn a normal return on capital), either as a landlord or as an owner-
occupier choosing between renting and owning. This implies that consumers of housing 
should be indifferent between home owning and renting. 
Suppose that the real interest rate i and the real growth g in market values are independent of 
the rate of inflation, ?. This concept can be represented by replacing i by (r + ?) and g by (gr + 
?) in equation (2). 
Therefore, equation (2) can be rewritten in real euro terms as  
 ? = (? + ?)?+?? + ??? ? (?? + ?)?, (3) 
 ? = ?? +?? + ??? ? ???, (4) 
where the cost of capital is defined in terms of the real interest rate, r and the housing market 
appreciation is defined in terms of real growth in market values gr. 
The first term in equation (4) is the cost of foregone real interest that the homeowner could 
have earned through investing in another asset. This one-year cost is calculated as the price of 
housing times the long-term real interest rate, r. The second term is the one-year cost of 
property taxes, calculated as the house price times the property tax rate tp.  The third term m 
reflects operating costs expressed as a fraction of the house value, P. Finally, the fourth term 
is the house price times gr, which is the expected real rate of house price appreciation. The 
sum of these four terms gives the total return to housing capital. 
If the time period would span a long period, including periods of changing monetary policies 
and business cycles, the use of real growth rates would give better representation of market 
conditions. Since we are dealing with a relatively short time period and generally low and 
stable inflation rates within that time period, we deem the correction for real growth 
unnecessary. Therefore we return to equation (2). 
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Equation (2) can be modified by adding the tax deductibility of mortgage interest for owners 
who itemize on their capital gains or federal income taxes as follows: 
 ? = ?(1? ?)? +? + ?? ? ???. (5) 
The right hand side of Equation (5) is the annual cost of ownership, expressed in euro terms, 
and the equation in the brackets is the cost per euro of the total house value. 
In the context of our study, Finland, property taxes and operating costs are allocated to 
individual dwellings through monthly maintenance fees to the housing cooperative1.  
Rearranging equation (5) we obtain 
 ???? = ((1? ?)? ? ?)?, (6) 
where Rnet is the net rent after deducting the operating costs and property taxes from the gross 
rent. This is the periodical explicit or implicit cashflow produced by the housing unit, either in 
the form of rent payment from tenant to landlord or as a rental equivalent yield for the owner-
occupier of a housing unit. Some authors argue for the use of a constant depreciation rate (e.g. 
Poterba, 1991; Himmelberg et al., 2005), but we have not included such a variable as it 
somewhat unnecessary for the analysis of differences between cross-sectional capitalization 
rates. There is no consensus on how the depreciation rates should be attributed to different 
types  of  housing  units.  In  the  US,  some  authors  propose  higher  depreciation  rates  for  low-
income housing projects due to tenant characteristics, but such arguments do not seem to be 
applicable to the Finnish market.  
Dividing both sides by price P, we come up with the total return for any housing asset that are 
either explicit for the landlord or implicit for the owner-occupier:    
 ????
?
= (1 ? ?)? ? ?. (7) 
It is intuitively clear, and evident from the equations above, that if rents decrease in value, it 
should trigger selling of assets held for rent, and buying if they increase. On the other hand, 
                                               
1 For simplicity reasons, we have assumed the maintenance fee and property tax of single-family houses (which 
are typically not reported in the for sale advertisements) to be at the same per square meter level as of detached 
housing cooperatives. 
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when considering properties used as a home, the same equation should hold: if the same 
standard of living is achievable by renting with a much lower cost, sale of the property 
becomes rational. Alternatively, it does not make sense to pay more rent than the same 
property’s total cost of ownership would be when living in a rental home, so buying the 
property would be rational. Thus, prices and rents should continuously adjust to the long-term 
equilibrium level. In addition, for units with similar expected appreciation characteristics, the 
rental yields should essentially be the same and not dependable upon any other attributes, 
which is the focus of this study.  
Naturally, an important simplifying assumption is made about interest rate, I; perfect capital 
markets are assumed. The cost of borrowing (mortgage rate) is assumed equal to the 
opportunity cost of capital (alternative investment rate for the consumer). On the other hand, 
the interest deductibility (1-t) depends on the loan-to-value (LTV) or leverage ratio. In 
Finland there are also euro term ceilings on the maximum tax deductions for income taxes, 
which will be further discussed in section 2.2.4. 
Some authors have argued for the use of a separate risk premium exceeding the mortgage 
interest rate. Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Himmelberg et al. (2005) and Finicelli (2007) 
assume a risk premium of 2%. Poterba (1991) uses a 4% risk premium in user cost 
calculations, while Englund et al. (1995) McCarthy and Peach (2004) and Quigley and 
Raphael (2004) do not include an additional risk premium for owning housing assets. 
Discussion on risk can also be expanded to the uncertain future development of rents. Thus, 
price risk of owning housing assets and risk of rising rents would then be needed to be 
considered separately. Sinai and Souleles (2005) argue for ownership as hedging against 
future unanticipated movements in rental price. In their view, risk averse individuals “lock in” 
their future cashflows by buying into a desired housing mix instead of exposing themselves to 
potentially rising rents. Housing prices would thus capitalize a premium for avoiding net rent 
risk. In this study, however, we feel no need to separate risk premium from the expected 
appreciation unit, which will be discussed later in section 2.2.3. 
Another concept that can be linked to both the housing unit depreciation and risk premium is 
the “land leverage” as introduced by Bostic et al. (2007). They argue that changes in the 
overall property value will depend critically on how much of its total value is contained in the 
land, a proportion they define as land leverage. As housing units are a bundle of physical 
structures and the land underneath the structures, it can be argued that only a proportion of the 
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total asset value is depreciating over time. Thus, housing units with low land value would 
have higher depreciation rates than units with similar structures, but located in high land value 
areas. Investors would intuitively then require higher yields to compensate as the depreciation 
unit in the NAC equation would be higher. Simple arithmetic on somewhat extreme 
fluctuation in land value proportional to total value would signal differences up to 1% in net 
rental yield, assuming similar cost and depreciation for structures and land value ranging 
between 15 - 60% of total housing unit cost. However, Bostic et al. also show that housing 
assets  with  high  land  proportion  are  also  more  volatile  and  exposed  to  economic  shocks  in  
greater magnitude, which would likely offset differences. 
Unfortunately, there are also several complications with the empirical application of the no-
arbitrage condition. Due to high transaction costs and low liquidity of housing there is always 
slight divergence from the presented relation even if everyone in the market is fully rational. 
Credit constraints for the low-income deciles of the housing consumers certainly play a 
significant role, allowing landlords to benefit from the borrowing constraints of those who 
simply are unable to choose freely between taking a mortgage and renting. The transaction 
costs are also somewhat difficult to take into account, although with pre-planned housing 
tenure horizons one could make NPV calculations based on the no-arbitrage formula and 
include the transaction costs in the model. However, the investment horizon is immeasurable 
as well, and variation in the investment horizon could have an effect on the required rate of 
return through a risk component, which would vary in conjunction with risk aversion. 
2.2.1 From housing NAC to the Gordon growth model 
The no-arbitrage condition is closely related to the present value condition, i.e., to the fact that 
in an efficient market the price of a house must equal the present discounted value of its 
future net service (cash) flows. The two relations present the same idea somewhat differently. 
There is clear equivalence between the conventional Gordon growth model and the NAC. The 
Gordon growth model is presented as 
 
? = ?
? ? ?
 
(8) 
where C is the first period cash flow from the asset, r is the required rate of return and g is the 
expected growth rate of the cash flows. From (8) it is easy to see that in the no-arbitrage 
relation C equals Rnet, r is the cost of capital (1-t)i and g stands for the expected appreciated 
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rate. While in the conventional Gordon model it is the dividend and the rental growth rate that 
matter, in the NAC, the growth expectations are equal to the expected appreciation of housing 
in the next period. These can differ at times due to lags in adjustment of rents and prices, but 
in the long-run housing price growth and rental price growth are expected to be tightly 
related. 
Looking back to the previous section, the left hand side of equation (7) is often referred to as 
the rent-to-price ratio or the capitalization (CAP) rate in real estate literature. Following the 
Gordon analogy, it is easy to understand this yardstick for relative valuation: the discount rate 
used to capitalize current cash flows. In this study CAP rate and rental yield are used side-by-
side  as  they  refer  to  the  essentially  the  same  concept.  Different  notations  in  literature  arise  
from use of either gross or net yields, depending on whether maintenance costs, taxes or other 
operating costs have been deducted. Naturally, the use of micro data enables the use of net 
rental yield and net CAP rate, allowing for greater accuracy. 
Following the intuition of the Gordon model and the financial equilibrium model built on it, 
this study investigates the effect of several factors that could potentially influence the 
capitalization rate through their respective effect in the growth and discount rates. 
2.2.2 The model in literature and the contribution of this study 
Since the market relationship between house price and rental price is an important concept in 
the analysis of housing markets, the basic model of housing values is used widely in the 
housing  literature.  Mills  (1972)  shows the  model  starting  with  a  simple  case,  in  which  rent  
and house value are linked only by interest rate. In this example, homeowner’s only cost is the 
annual interest. Later, they incorporate taxation, capital gains, inflation and operating costs 
proportional to house price into the model. If the rental market is competitive, annual rent just 
covers  annual  cost.  In  other  words,  annual  rent  equals  the  annual  cost  of  home  ownership.  
Poterba (1984) suggests that the marginal benefit (implicit rent) and cost (the user cost of the 
asset) of owning the housing assets are equal to homeowners. The user cost of the asset, 
defined originally by Jorgenson (1963), is the sum of the after-tax opportunity cost of holding 
the capital asset, after-tax property taxes, and depreciation and repair, less the expected capital 
gain of the asset. Poterba (1984) uses this model to argue that inflation reduces the effective 
cost  of  homeownership  and  raises  the  tax  subsidy  to  owner  occupation.  He  shows  how  
changes in the expected inflation rate affect the real price of houses and the equilibrium size 
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of housing capital stock. Himmelberg et al. (2005) use the model to study rent-to-price ratios 
in housing markets. They measure the annual cost of homeownership for 46 metropolitan 
areas in the US over 25 years and compare them with local rents to determine the changes in 
the level of house prices. They find that, from 1995 to 2004, the cost of ownership rose 
somewhat relative to the cost of renting. Also, they demonstrate that house prices are more 
sensitive to changes in real interest rates when rates are already low. 
There have been many other papers employing the no arbitrage condition (e.g. McCarthy and 
Peach 2004, Girouard et al. 2006, Finicelli 2007) to assess if housing prices on aggregate 
level are misaligned in one or more countries or cities. The empirical application of the 
condition involves several problems, such as the evaluation of maintenance costs and 
comparability of rental and ownership data. Glaeser and Gyourko (2007) discuss this problem 
especially in the US context, where the owner-occupied versus rental stock of housing are 
physically very different, located in different parts of the metropolitan area and have access to 
a very different set of amenities. In our study, we attempt to avoid the metropolitan-level 
problem by collecting information about variables at the neighborhood-level in our sample of 
Helsinki Metropolitan Area.  
However, the main problem with using the NAC model is the catch-all variable of expected 
appreciation, as it by its nature is the balancing force in the equilibrium – any consideration of 
over- or undervaluation is essentially a discussion on whether the appreciation rates implied 
by the model are sensible or not.      
2.2.3 Key to the model – the catch-all expected appreciation variable 
The expected appreciation variable of the model has received many different considerations in 
the studies focusing on variation of the aggregate equilibrium rental yield. Typically, simple 
and often somewhat arbitrary assumptions concerning the expected appreciation are used in 
the literature. Poterba (1992), Girouard et al (2006) and Garner and Verbrugge (2009) assume 
that expected housing price appreciation equals the expected rate in overall inflation. Englund 
et al. (1995), in turn, employ the average capital gain as the sum of long-term inflation 
expectations and historical growth in real rents. Himmelberg et al. (2005), who also include a 
forward-looking component by adding the spread between short- and long-term interest rates 
in the user cost formula, use the average real growth rate of housing prices from 1940 to 2000 
as a proxy for expected real appreciation. Furthermore, Smith and Smith (2006), while 
  13 
 
building an NPV model to assess potential overvaluation, use the same arbitrary expected 
appreciation values (in the base case 3%) for a number of different areas in the US. 
When analyzing the housing markets as a whole and focusing on the aggregate rent to price 
figures as a yardstick for over- or undervaluation, the measurement of the expected 
appreciation is of major importance, since different methodologies can lead to different 
conclusions about the extent of misalignment in housing prices. Obviously, the use of the 
purely backward-looking expectations utilized in several papers may induce misleading 
conclusions. Past price appreciation or overall inflation do not necessarily represent 
expectations. For example, if housing prices have risen rapidly during the past few years and 
are currently notably above the fundamental level, backward-looking expectations based on 
relatively short history would also imply fast housing inflation in the future. On the contrary, 
rational agents would be likely to take the prevailing overpricing into account. That is, 
rational agents would expect the adjustment of housing prices towards the fundamental level 
and, therefore, the forward-looking expectations would predict a substantially lower 
appreciation figure. 
When applying the discussion above to the focus of this study, i.e. the variation of the net 
rental yield between different types of housing units instead of longitudinal aggregate 
variation, the question arises whether the potential variation of the net rental yields could 
simply be interpreted as variation in the expected appreciation rates - i.e. particular types of 
apartments in certain locations would be expected to gain more in value. Location clearly has 
major significance in the development of housing prices, and thus it is easy to interpret that 
some areas are expected to gain more value than others.   
Capozza and Helsley (1990) as well as Capozza and Sick (1994) model variation of the 
expected appreciation by geographical regions. Their investigations of urban growth with 
uncertainty suggest variables such as income, income growth, population, population growth, 
developable area in a city, construction costs and lagged growth of population and income 
lead to geographical variation in expected appreciation rates. Usually these variables are 
employed to metropolitan level data, and intra-city variation is rarely considered. Studies, 
such as Himmelberger et al. (2005) and Chichernea et al. (2008), show the geographical 
variation in aggregate rental yields as a result of these demand and supply side constraints 
driving the expected appreciation in different metropolitan areas.  
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There are a very limited number of studies which would link values, rents and potential 
differences in appreciation rates within metropolitan areas and across city neighborhoods. 
Janssen, Soderberg and Zhou (2001) use hedonic models to explain capitalization rates across 
building types, ages and four specific locations in Stockholm. Rather than the issue of cross-
sectional determinants of valuations,  they are more concerned with estimation methods than 
interpreting the results for the variation in their observed capitalization rates.  
Intuitively, there is no reason why the expected appreciation should vary between housing 
units with different characteristics other than location. Macro trends suggesting more demand 
for certain types of housing in the future are difficult, if not impossible, to foresee, and thus it 
is also difficult to believe the market as a whole would form rational expectations about the 
relative performance of, for instance, small studios versus large multi-room apartments in the 
long run. We will return to the preferences of Finnish housing consumers later in section 
2.5.1.  
2.2.4 The impact of inflation, tax breaks, tax subsidies and social housing benefits 
to owner-occupied housing 
The impact of inflation on housing demand can be shown by using the basic housing value 
model. When inflation rates increase, nominal interest rates are augmented, and there will be 
an increase in both homeowner`s interest charges and nominal capital gains. However, an 
increase in the inflation rate reduces the real cost of homeownership because homeowners can 
deduct mortgage interest payments from their taxable income. This will lead homeowners to 
gain on balance. They will receive the full nominal capital gains, but they will pay only some 
of the interest charges. This suggests that there is a positive relationship between inflation and 
housing demand. Since the cost of ownership declines with a higher inflation rate, people are 
more willing to buy houses instead of renting, which results in an increase in real house 
prices. For example, Poterba (1984) shows that the high inflation rates in the 1970s led to a 30 
percent increase in real house prices and the stock of owner-occupied housing. However, J.R. 
Kearl (1978) argues that the financial position of homeowners is not affected by the 
expectation of inflation in the long-run. Even though the debt of homeowners rises in the 
present, inflation may provide higher nominal incomes to compensate higher payments. 
Historically, this has been the case in the Finnish context, but it is nowadays limited to the 
individual’s ability to itemize interest payments in their capital gains taxation as ceilings are 
in place for deductions from income taxes (Oikarinen 2007). 
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So far, we have discussed the tax deductibility of mortgages and after-tax cost of capital, 
while ignoring the other two tax subsidies attributable to owner-occupied housing: the tax 
exemption of living in your own house and the tax exemption of capital gains from selling 
your own house.  
Oikarinen (2009) emphasizes that while owner-occupants are not taxed for the implicit 
income produced by the housing assets in their possession, a capital gains tax is imposed on 
the rental returns (net of maintenance costs and interest payments on the loan that is borrowed 
to buy the dwelling) in Finland. Moreover, housing appreciation is taxed when a rental 
dwelling is sold. Hence, because of the tax benefits of owner-occupied housing, housing is 
worth less for investors than for owner-occupiers if the other variables in equation (1) are the 
same for both groups. Therefore, if housing is of equal worth to owner-occupants and 
portfolio investors, the required return for investors has to be set lower or the future 
expectations have to be more positive than those of the owner-occupants. The return required 
by a portfolio investor may be relatively smaller due to the greater diversification benefits 
gained by owning multiple dwellings (and possibly also other assets) in a portfolio. In 
addition, investors may be less risk-averse than households and may have lower interest costs 
on debt. Furthermore, professional skills and scale economies of a large investor may lower 
maintenance costs. However, without precise knowledge on the holding periods and capital 
structures, accurate estimates of tax effects on the equilibrium cannot be calculated. 
Housing subsidies provided by the government could create segmented market spaces, 
especially in the low-income end, where individuals would prefer renting to owning. In 
Finland low-income individuals can claim housing allowance for up to 80% of housing costs2. 
The allowance is subject to multiple limitations on housing unit size, costs, and individuals’ 
income and net worth. Other subgroups of market participants such as students and pensioners 
might distort the overall rent-setting if subsidies drive choices between renting and owning. 
Subsidies can clearly create market segments where renting is more desired than owning, but 
these lasting effects should influence prices as well: higher rents would be priced in as 
investors would compete for assets where natural clientele exists. Thus, any unequal treatment 
of owning and renting should have no effect on net rental yield on effective markets. 
                                               
2 Source: www.kela.fi (Kela – the social insurance institution of Finland) 
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2.3 Determinants of value, rent and rental yield 
In the previous sections, we have concentrated on the formation of asset prices as a purely 
financial process, where relevant considerations are required rate of return, expected 
appreciation, risk and regulatory issues such as taxation. Due to the dual nature of housing as 
an asset class (investment as well as consumption), these considerations are not enough to 
gain a full understanding of the market. As will be discussed later, the housing market cannot 
be characterized as efficient, even of the weak form (see. e.g. Case and Shiller (1989)), and 
therefore, understanding the formation of supply and demand for properties on the consumer 
preference level is also necessary. 
This section reviews several studies that form a basis for our hypotheses. Firstly, we go 
through perhaps the most puzzling observation about rental yield – the negative relationship 
between rental yield and house value. We then go through other studies that have addressed 
the issue of variation of capitalization rates, and finally, we turn to detailed hedonic studies 
that have deployed variables relevant to this study in the formation of hedonic house price or 
rent functions.  
2.3.1 The relationship of rent and value 
As discussed in section 2.2.3, previous literature has paid relatively little attention to the 
determinants of rental yield, merely interpreting the deviation as differences in expected 
appreciation. While focusing on the housing markets as a whole at metropolitan levels, the 
question of which particular housing assets are profitable to own has not attracted interest in 
the academic literature reviewed here.  
Nevertheless, some evidence on the determinants of rental yield can be found from past 
literature. Most recently Garner and Verbrugge (2009) and later Tian (2008) have found that 
estimated rents are concave with estimated value, i.e. rents increase at a decreasing rate 
relative to value. In the absence of a credible explanation, this raises concern about the 
efficiency of the housing market. It is intuitively clear that there should be no relationship 
between value and return in real estate pricing models where CAP rate does not vary with 
value are standard and following EMH. Taking an analogy from the stock market, a share 
costing 10 Euros should have very similar return characteristics to a share costing 100 Euros, 
all else equal. 
  17 
 
In the US, the reasons to study the rent-to-value relationship and other determinants of cap 
rate have been mainly statistical. The Bureau of Economic Analysis uses capitalization rates 
to incorporate housing services produced by residential housing assets to national income and 
product accounts. According to Tian (2008) they use a convex CAP rate (falling with value), 
but the deviations mostly occur at the very low end of housing values, which is explained by 
the use of gross income, ignoring depreciation and operating costs, which could be an 
unusually large proportion of the gross rent. In our study, these maintenance cost issues are 
avoided because we have proper data for the periodical maintenance fees including property 
taxes. 
Garner and Verbrugge (2009) have used owners’ estimates of rental equivalence and value 
reported in the US Consumer Expenditure survey to study the determinants of reported rental 
equivalence. They find that rental equivalence is concave in value. Since owner estimates of 
rental equivalence and value are not transaction prices, it is difficult to see why owners of 
higher value units should report significantly lower rent-to-value ratios, particularly when the 
question is asked in four successive interviews as part of successive waves of the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey. 
Following this finding by Garner and Verbrugge, and in an attempt to explain it, Tian (2008) 
collects a dataset on 148 matched dwellings in Washington DC during a one-month time-
frame. He concludes that the rent-value relationship is clearly concave. Tian’s data consists of 
single family and multifamily housing units worth between 105,000 and 1,125,000 dollars. As 
Tian points out, the first possible explanation would be that there is possibly a case for higher 
required yields for very low value rentals arising from negative occupant characteristics 
including credit risk and higher depreciation, but that all of these effects should disappear 
well before the $105,000 value segment. It is worthwhile mentioning that in Finland landlords 
are typically covered for credit risk by a functioning guarantee rent system, where occupants 
deposit typically 1-3 months’ rent in advance to a mutual bank account or simply pay similar 
advances to the landlord that are only returnable upon moving out. Thus, low-income housing 
units should not bear higher rental yields due to differing credit risk or other quality 
considerations regarding the renters.         
Hargreaves (2005), reporting the results of a survey of residential landlords of 1,585 New 
Zealand rental properties, finds a similar decreasing relationship between value and rent. He 
also finds the functional form of the trend to be logarithmic rather than linear. Hargreaves’ 
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interpretation of the result is that renters are simply unwilling to pay for some additional 
features that add value to the house, such as extra land, views and extra bathrooms.  
The second possible explanation to the rent-value puzzle would be different expected 
appreciation rates, meaning that more valuable housing units would gain more value going 
forward. Although this seems an attractive explanation, it is at odds with the basic principles 
of EMH and should not be considered reasonable.   
As an alternative explanation, Tian (2008) proposes assumptions of a segmented housing 
market, where the number of renters falls simultaneously with the cost of renting i.e. the net 
rental yield. The model is based on the fundamental insight by Titman (1982) of individuals’ 
tenure choice as a comparison between user costs comprising of mortgage payments and 
operating expenses and the market rent, as already discussed under our model assumptions. 
Tian’s model proposes a segmented housing market, and it relies on the fact that user cost of 
households varies inversely with income due to the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing 
and the relatively lower borrowing cost facing households with higher income, as in the US, 
they can itemize more interest deductions3. Furthermore, because housing consumption rises 
with income (even for rental housing) and also varies inversely with user cost, housing value 
should  increase  with  income.  In  their  studies  focusing  on  the  taxation  aspects  of  the  issue,  
Palmon and Smith (1998) found a negative correlation between user cost and physical size of 
housing units for single family housing units in Houston. 
Following from the insight that  user cost  in the US falls  with the size of the mortgage (and 
house value), the high-end homeowners’ cost measures are permanently lower than the 
professional landlords with constant capitalization rates. This, combined with absolutely low 
level of rental demand in the high end, creates a situation where equilibrium does not exist. 
The market is then cleared by “inframarginal” landlords who have a number of idiosyncratic 
reasons to retain the ownership of their housing unit (for example due to personal attachment 
to a particular unit, a desire to avoid a taxable event associated with sale of the unit etc.) and 
are therefore satisfied with a lower return. This, in turn, forces the professional landlords out 
of  the  high-end  of  the  market.  In  the  low-end  of  the  market,  where  demand  for  rental  
                                               
3 In the US system, there is no upper limit on one’s ability to deduct interest payments from taxable income. 
Thus, the ability to “save” on tax deductions increases with the marginal tax rate.   
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apartments is higher, these inframarginal landlords earn similar yields to the professional 
landlords, whose elastic supply clears the market at the equilibrium capitalization rate. 
Tian’s argumentation is intriguing but requires more inspection when applied into Finnish 
context. The proposition of falling user costs does not apply as the tax deductions are made 
from capital gains which are taxed at the flat 28% rate. In addition, the user cost is actually 
rising with the value of the home for the individuals who take benefit of the capital income 
deficit crediting, which allows them to deduct the mortgage payments from their income 
taxes. As these deductions have maximum amounts imposed, the user cost is rising after the 
ceiling is met. 
The  more  appealing  argument  is  the  proposition  of  inframarginal  landlords.  As  we  will  
discuss later in chapter 2.5.1, Finns have strong preferences to move towards ownership 
tenure as income rises. According to Juntto (2007) ownership dominates the desired tenure 
choice already from the 3rd income decile onwards with the proportion of renters falling by 
every decile and only 1% of households in the top income decile report renting as their most 
desired tenure option. Combining this with the inframarginal landlord proposition, one could 
propose  that  the  amount  of  landlords  wishing  to  rent  their  housing  units  at  rates  below  
equilibrium levels could well be enough to cover the whole demand in the housing market. In 
this case the conclusion would be that Finns disregard financial considerations and opt for 
ownership even if there would be cheaper housing options available in the rental markets. 
This would inflate the prices compared to rents and allow for such disequilibrium to exist. 
2.3.2 Other studies on rental yield determinants 
Hundreds of studies have documented various specifications of hedonic models with either 
house value or rent as the dependent variable. However, as discussed earlier, due to severe 
limitations in availability of data, there have been few attempts to explain the relationship 
between these determinants and their joint effect on the rental yield. A common approach is to 
combine price series data of rents and values, but this is usually seen as problematic due to the 
potential bias arising from the possible differences in the attributes of the two series, i.e. 
comparing apples to oranges (see also section 2.2.2). In the following, we review few of the 
rare previous studies that have made an attempt to overcome these data limitations. 
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Janssen et al. (2001) study capitalization rates with a data set of 351 multi-unit properties in 
Stockholm.  Their  variables  only  include  age  and  3  dummy  coefficients  for  locations  (East,  
South, and West) within Stockholm. They find high consistence for both rents and values for 
whole apartment buildings in the inner city of Stockholm, explaining 97 and 85 percent of the 
respective variation in the logarithmic rent and value functions. Increasing age seems to lower 
both rents and prices, but the age effect is stronger with respect to prices, driving up the 
capitalization rates for older apartment buildings. As they have no information on the 
maintenance costs, they conclude that older buildings probably cost more to maintain and 
have a shorter remaining life. However, they note that the option to redevelop these buildings 
should  be  thought  to  have  some  value.  One  particular  area,  Stockholm  East,  offers  lower  
rental yield because prices are higher, but rents compare with other parts of the city. Janssen 
et al. assume that this is due to more stable tenants, lower maintenance costs and less risk than 
in other areas.  
Hattapoglu (2009) studies two micro datasets from Houston metropolitan area using house 
price and rent listings between 1996 and 2007 from Houston Association of realtors. In his 
study, Hattapoglu matches rents and values by determining separate hedonic rent and price 
functions for every neighborhood in the Houston area. He then compares the implicit rents to 
actual prices, and vice versa, with the model similar to the one employed in this study. He 
finds that size in square feet, distance to the central business unit and past price appreciation 
have a negative relationship with the estimated rental yield, while the number of bedroom has 
a positive coefficient.  
Hattapoglu does not include value as a predictor for the rent to price ratio. He interprets the 
negative coefficient of size to result from higher income consumers purchasing larger 
apartments, and he claims that lower capitalization rates result from lower mortgage fees for 
high income consumers. Moreover, the positive coefficient for the number of bedrooms may 
indicate that consumers prefer houses with fewer bedrooms that have more per square footage 
relative to houses with more bedrooms that have less per square footage. These findings are 
interesting for our study, as we have the possibility to explore these effects even further with a 
more complete dataset, whereas Hattapoglu focuses only on houses and neglects some 
potentially interesting variables. 
Importantly, Hattapoglu shows that the current rental yield is dependent on past price 
appreciation, but not on past rent appreciation. Thus, Hattapoglu concludes that people’s 
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appreciation expectations are based on past price appreciation, not changes in rents. The 
coefficients of rent appreciation are insignificant in all of his results. This provides evidence 
for potential price instability where movements in rent to price ratio are based on prices 
moving, not rents. 
Chichernea et al. (2008) compare aggregate apartment capitalization rates between 34 US 
metropolitan areas and explain the geographical variation in aggregate capitalization rate of 
multiapartment properties, based on 2,116 transactions between 2000 and 2005. The controls 
for property characteristics include square feet, age, distance to the center of the city, location 
(metropolitan area) and time. The transaction data is clearly different from our study as it 
comprises observations where whole buildings of multiple rental apartments have been sold. 
Thus, the stock of housing is clearly different from our Finnish data, where owner-occupied 
and rented apartments can be located next door to each other. The same difference applies to 
Janssen et al. (2001) who had a similar dataset of complete rental properties.  
However, the article by Chichernea et al. (2008) is relevant to this study, as it has a very rich 
set of metropolitan level variables to explain the variation in capitalization rates, which can be 
investigated using our data for individual apartments and houses as well. They model the 
expected growth rate on both demand and supply side factors. Demand side variables include 
employment growth, GDP growth, income growth and population growth. On the supply side, 
they test three separate indices used to proxy supply side constraints such as stringency of 
regulation and development process restrictiveness, which have been shown to positively 
impact housing prices. They also include measures for market liquidity and capital flow 
measures. 
Expected effects are intuitively clear: higher future demand decreases CAP rate through 
higher expected appreciation rates, more supply constraints mean lower discount rates as rent 
and price growth is harder to match with more supply. Liquidity means less risk and it 
reduces capitalization rates as do capital flows from large markets towards smaller markets. 
The results from Chichernea et al. (2008) suggest that the supply side constraints are powerful 
determinants for the variation in the apartment capitalization rates across metropolitan areas. 
However, the demand side factors receive little significance. Liquidity and capital flow 
measures seem to explain variation in the capitalization rate and their effect is negative as 
predicted. 
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Vacancy rate is clearly an important variable regarding the net rental yield, as all rent data 
should theoretically be adjusted downwards along with the vacancy rate, pushing net rental 
yields lower. There is potential variation in the vacancy rate across dwelling types and 
locations, but in the Finnish context the data availability is a major problem for studying the 
effect. In their analysis of user costs and rental equivalence, Garner & Verbrugge (2009) 
adjust their predicted rents with region-level vacancy rates and note the need for vacancy 
figures for more precise areas. Glaeser and Gyourko (2007) also note that there is potentially 
significant variance in the expected tenure length of different types of households, which 
would again result in variation in the net rental yields.   
To our knowledge there is no credible research done to find out whether the capitalization 
rates vary between different residential building types or dwelling setups. In the Finnish 
context the legislative setting is homogenous between apartments (or condominiums in US 
terms) and multifamily properties built as row houses, two-family houses or even housing 
cooperatives consisting of multiple individual houses on a jointly-owned piece of land. In the 
case of single-family houses there is the unobserved and potentially significant variation in 
the lot size of the property that could have some sort of a role, but without sufficient data we 
are unable to model the lot size in the hedonic pricing functions.  
2.3.3 Variables in hedonic value and rent functions 
Malpezzi (2002) offers a thorough recap on the selection of variables for any hedonic model 
predicting rents or values of housing units. According to Malpezzi, the most important 
variables for a hedonic model are number of rooms, floor area, structure type, and age of the 
unit, socioeconomic neighborhood characteristics, distance to central business units or sub-
centers of employment or education, time of data collection and possible tenant 
characteristics. However, Malpezzi notes that there are potentially hundreds of other housing 
characteristics that can be deployed in hedonic models. Sirmans and Benjamin (1991) review 
a vast number of studies regarding determination of market rent, covering all of the above 
variables. Correspondingly, Laakso (1997) goes through a number of studies on the hedonic 
pricing of housing units.  
In the Finnish context, Laakso (1997) has investigated the demand for housing characteristics 
and urban housing prices, using transaction data of approximately 18,800 observations ending 
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1993. No related studies have been conducted regarding residential market rents in Finland. 
The following sections report briefly the effects of some variables on housing values. 
Structure type and age 
Laakso (1997) reports results on the structure type on dwelling prices in the Helsinki 
Metropolitan Area. He reports housing prices to increase monotonically with respect to 
dwelling size, and the elasticity is somewhat standard across sizes, except for size classes of 
around 200 square meters. It is worth noting that the prices have a modest jump around that 
range and this effect is signified in the case of multi-storey apartment buildings.  
Laakso finds interesting results for the age variable. In Finland, the overall low general 
quality of planning, design and construction of the 1960s and 1970s suppresses prices the 
most compared to the referential decade of 1990. Looking back, house prices fell until the 
pre-war period and before the effect of the old vintage housing of the early century starts to 
increase prices from 1930s backwards. It is clearly evident, that age as a linear indicator of 
quality is of incorrect functional form when measuring housing values.    
Most studies listed by Benjamin and Sirmans (1991) record similar relationship between rents 
and apartment age. Results on structure type are rare, as studies on rent mostly focus on 
apartment  complexes  in  the  US,  and  therefore,  comparing  the  results  to  the  Finnish  context  
would be challenging.  
Location variables 
The basis for the modern microeconomic urban economics was created by studies of Alonso 
(1964) among others. The principal difference between urban economics and traditional 
microeconomics is in the role of location in the determination of demand, supply and price. 
Alonso presents a model of households’ location choice which is based on traditional 
consumer theory. In his model, transport costs combined with distance to the city center are 
crucial  factors  in  the  determination  of  land  rent  and  households’  optimal  location.  After  the  
arrival of hedonic pricing models (see e.g., Lancaster, 1966; Rosen, 1974), the structural 
properties of the dwellings and the characteristics connected with location and neighborhood 
variables are considered as components in the multidimensional basket of housing.  
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In the basic equilibrium regarding housing location, households maximize their utility 
between marginal transport costs and marginal savings from land rent costs, both of which are 
functions of distance to the central business district (CBD). The variation in households’ bid 
rent functions,  due to differences in incomes or preferences,  explains why different kinds of 
households are located in different parts of the city, in other words, it explains why cities are 
segregated.  
Four simplistic assumptions about cities are often made in the equilibrium studies (Fujita 
1989). Firstly, cities are assumed monocentric with only one CBD, and the transport system is 
assumed dense in all directions and free of congestion. The city is also assumed round and 
uniform. Finally, the public goods and externalities are assumed not to exist. These 
assumptions are quite simple, and a vast number of studies have gone beyond the assumptions 
and extended the analysis to a very detailed degree, enhancing the basic model. However, as 
Laakso (1992) points out, even the enhanced spatial models are too restrictive and fail to 
explain housing prices and dynamics as a function of location only. Therefore, hedonic 
models incorporating the distance variables should be used.  
Laakso (1997) uses several location factors to regress dwelling price. Most relevant factors to 
this study are the location to the central business district and location to the nearest railway or 
subway station. The results for distance to Helsinki center are unsurprising, although it is 
worth noting that for houses and row houses the distance effects on price are very large in the 
market for houses closest to the center. This is natural, because of the scarcity of houses 
within 10-15 minutes from the city center.  
Vicinity of rail traffic is a more complex matter. Both accessibility and negative externalities 
are strongly connected to railway and subway stations. In HMA, the fastest public transport 
connections from suburbs to the city centre and several sub-centers are based on local 
railways and the subway. However, there are possible sources of externalities associated with 
railway stations. Many are located near road with heavy traffic, and in several cases, there are 
parking areas and feeder bus terminals close to the station. Hence, there are negative 
externalities caused by traffic in the form of noise, air pollution and accident risk. Unrest, 
crime and untidiness are also concentrated close to some stations.  
Laakso’s (1997) results generally signal that the positive accessibility factors outweigh the 
negative externalities for both the subway and railway networks. However, unless negative 
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neighborhood effects are otherwise controlled for, the negative externalities for subway 
stations look extremely strong in a dummy variable model. Laakso concludes this to be a 
characteristic of neighborhoods in the immediate vicinity of the subway station. In general, 
subway has a further reaching effect to house values compared to the rail network. 
Benjamin and Sirmans (1994) study the effect of mass transportation on apartment rents and 
find that in Washington D.C. rents fall 2.6% for every one-tenth mile decrease in the distance 
from the nearest subway station. 
Another location variable, which is in the focus of this study, comes indirectly from the 
research on rental markets. As a natural clientele for rental apartments, students have been 
shown to impact rent levels. Benjamin and Sirmans (1991) report students’ preference to live 
in close proximity to their campus having an impact on market rents. Ogur (1973) finds that 
rent is positively affected by college enrolment among other factors. Therefore, it may be 
worthwhile to incorporate a variable denoting distance from the nearest major campus in 
Finland.  
 
        
Neighborhood variables 
According to theoretical urban models concerning segregation, households prefer the 
homogeneity of the social structure of the neighborhood and want to live in an area where 
their own social group is well-presented (e.g. Fujita, 1989; Li and Brown, 1980). Laakso 
(1997) concludes that almost all hedonic studies find significant effects concerning the socio-
economic structure of neighborhoods.  
Laakso uses a variety of variables to analyze the effect of neighborhood-level socio-economic 
structure on dwelling values. These include education level, income level, share of owner 
occupied dwellings, unemployment rate, household size, social rental housing, population 
with foreign origin and crime rate. Because of high multicollinearity, Laakso proposes that 
only a small number of variables regarding social status should be used to avoid distorting the 
model specification. Laakso finds that the social status of the residential area has an extremely 
strong influence on housing prices in Helsinki.  
  26 
 
Vacancy 
Sirmans & Benjamin (1991) conclude that studies testing the effects of vacancy rates on rents 
have conflicting results. Nevertheless, most of the studies seem to find a negative effect on 
rent. In the related literature the researchers have also coined a concept of natural vacancy rate 
that changes between metropolitan areas. Rosen and Smith (1983) study vacancy rates and 
conclude that much of the variation in vacancy rates between cities results from differences in 
the natural vacancy rates rather than the degree of market tightness. High growth areas have 
higher natural vacancy rates due to additions from the supply side and lower rents.    
2.4 Evaluation of housing market efficiency 
As discussed above in section 2.2, the housing market efficiency can be analyzed using the 
basic model of housing values. Expectations about house price appreciation are important in 
analyzing housing market efficiency. Most empirical research testing the efficiency of real 
estate markets focuses on informational efficiency. In their classic paper, Case and Shiller 
(1989) show that markets adjust slowly to changing market conditions. They also show that, 
in the short-run, one can time the market and earn excess profits,  which runs counter to the 
efficient market hypothesis. However, they conclude that it is nearly impossible to 
definitively prove whether the housing market is overvalued or not at certain point in time. 
Interestingly, they note that the historical time-series on implicit rents of owner-occupied 
houses is crucial to study these inefficiencies, because they see implicit rents as dividends for 
housing, which should be studied together with the price appreciation. 
Inefficiencies with respect to observable demographics have been commonly in focus. For 
example, Mankiw and Weil (1989) argue that, in the US, there was an increase in demand for 
housing due to the Baby Boom in the 1970s, during which the inflation rate increased 
substantially. This increase was predictable well in advance. They state that the housing 
market probably should not be characterized as an efficient asset market in which prices 
reflect available information on future demand. 
As some researchers have pointed out, predicting housing market bubbles has almost become 
a common past time in the US and around the world. Stiglitz (1990) provides a general 
definition of asset bubbles: “If the reason that the price is high today is only because investors 
believe that the selling price is high tomorrow – when ‘fundamental’ factors do not seem to 
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justify such a price – then a bubble exists.” At least in the short run, the high price of the asset 
is merited, because it yields a return (capital gain plus dividend) equal to that on alternative 
assets. Case and Shiller (2003) define a housing market bubble as being driven by home 
buyers who are willing to pay inflated prices for houses today because they expect 
unrealistically high housing appreciation in the future. An analysis based on the NAC model 
can give interesting insights about bubbles. Even in its narrowest form where rents are 
compared with observed prices, it implies the appreciation rates expected by markets. 
Oikarinen (2009) notes that because of their simplicity and appealing intuition to the general 
public, housing rent-to-price ratio and housing price-to-income ratio have repeatedly been 
employed, e.g., by credit institutions and the media to justify views concerning the 
sustainability of existing housing price level. However, as already discussed with the 
breakdown of the model, several of the variables are too vague and based on expectations to 
give accurate information on the state of the market as a whole. Long term changes in supply, 
demand, lot prices and institutional settings can have significant impact on the aggregate rent-
to-price ratio, and the constant rent-to-price can shift up or down (diPasquale & Wheaton, 
1996). Finally, as discussed earlier, due to differences in the quality of rental versus owner 
occupied housing, appreciation rates and rent-to-price ratios calculated from aggregated data 
have considerable measurement errors. Analyzing the issue of efficiency in the housing 
market using aggregated data may give biased results. 
In the market for corporate equities, the forecasting power of the dividend yield (i.e. the ratio 
between dividend payments and the stock price) on future returns is a hypothesis that has a 
long tradition among practitioners and academics. The dividend-to-price ratio in the stock 
market is often used to examine market efficiency issues (see, e.g., Black and Scholes 1974; 
Fama and French 1988). In the housing market context, the rent-to-price ratio is treated as the 
real estate equivalent of a dividend-to-price ratio for equities. Even though calculation of total 
returns on the housing market is nearly impossible, it is insufficient to deem cross-sectional 
variation in net rental yield as mere variation in the future expected appreciation rates. 
Variations in periodical cash flows are too important to neglect when considering the total 
return available for housing investment.    
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2.5 Short description of the Finnish housing market 
The Finnish housing market can be divided into two main sectors: the privately financed 
housing sector and the subsidized sector. After the rent control system was ultimately 
discontinued in 1995, the privately financed sector has been free to form prices and rents 
without restrictions (except for the part of increases to existing contracts). Rents and prices in 
the subsidized sector, controlled ultimately by governmental entities, will be left out of the 
scope  of  this  study.  Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  the  dynamics  of  how  
subsidized housing can influence the prices and rents of the privately financed sector, 
particularly as construction of subsidized housing generally decreases demand for privately 
owned rental units leading to decline in rents, housing values and private construction 
(DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1996). 
According to Statistics Finland, over 60% of the Finnish dwellings are owner-occupied, while 
the rental market is internationally small at less than 40% of the total housing stock of 2.5 
million dwellings. Approximately 1% of the homes are “right of occupancy” dwellings. 
Statistics Finland estimated the total market value of Finnish housing stock at roughly 200 
billion Euros at the end of 2004. 
According to Oikarinen (2007) the subsidized public sector and institutional investors own 
approximately half of the rental homes, and industry information provider Kiinteistötieto 
provides a figure of slightly less than 400,000 non-subsidized rental dwellings in Finland. Of 
these, some 50% are owned by small, mainly individual investors, while the rest are owned by 
institutions of varying levels of professionalism. 
In the broader European perspective, the share of the Finnish rental market of the total 
housing stock is relatively small, which is likely due to a history of tax-incentivized home 
ownership. These particular tax questions have, from time to time, been in the focus of public 
discussion in Finland and are covered in section 2.2.4. 
Historically, pension funds, insurance companies and not-for-profit foundations have formed 
the bulk of institutional investors in the housing market. However, significant players such as 
VVO and Sato, who have historically been involved in the subsidized sector, have increased 
their participation in the privately financed sector as well, and the market has also seen the 
formation of the first housing market focused property funds during the first decade of 2000s. 
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The funds investing in rental residential properties have taken the form of limited 
partnerships, while the Finnish legislative framework regarding the development of REITs is 
still lagging behind in the public tax discussion and has not been modified to resemble the 
common international models.  
In the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, where the liquidity of the housing markets can be expected 
to be the greatest, the composition of the housing stock of roughly half a million dwellings 
differs somewhat from the national stock. As much as three quarters of the dwelling stock is 
located in multi-storey buildings and the share of privately financed apartments is 
approximately 40%. Of this, little less than 60% is owner-occupied (StatFin). According to 
Helsinki’s official webpage4, 39 % of all dwellings are privately financed, owner-occupied 
and 23 % privately financed, rental occupied. 
Oikarinen (2007) provides a thorough historical perspective on the evolution of the Finnish 
housing market since the 1970s. Finnish housing markets have gone through major 
institutional changes during the past two decades. Firstly, in the late 1980s, the Finnish 
financial market was deregulated. Secondly, in 1993, there was a reform in the tax codes 
concerning the deductibility of mortgage interest payments in taxation. Thirdly, rent 
regulation was released in several stages during 1992-95. These institutional changes have 
had major impacts on the housing price dynamics. Furthermore, mainly due to increased 
migration from peripheral areas to the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (HMA) and to a couple of 
other centers in Finland, regional housing price development has diverged to a much greater 
extent since the early 1990s than earlier. 
After the oil crisis of the 1970s, the housing prices increased nominally, but decreased on real 
terms until the start of 1980s. Following a few years of steady prices in the mid-80s, an 
immense rise in the housing prices began in 1987. This was to a great extent a consequence of 
the financial deregulation that took place in Finland, and as ceilings on average lending rates 
were abolished by the Bank of Finland, the availability of housing loans exploded in 1986 
leading to a housing market boom.  
                                               
4 www.hel.fi 
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Figure 2: 
Real price index for Finnish condominiums Q1/1970 – Q2/2009, 1970 = 100 
Figure 2 illustrates housing price appreciation from 1970 to the second quarter of 2009. 1970 is the base year, set 
at the value of 100. The spike after year 1986 is often attributed to the deregulation of Finnish financial market, 
while the rapid decline in the early 1990s was simultaneous with a general period of recession in the economy. 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the housing price appreciation from 1970 to date.  Following a real price 
increase of 58% from late 1986 to 1989 the market crashed by 50% before the end of 1992. 
The HMA was even more volatile as it fell over 66% and 57%, respectively. The most 
dramatic movements occurred in southern Helsinki, where the prices peaked a quarter later 
than in the rest of the country. After the recession of the 1990’s in Finland, there has been a 
steep increase in prices, which has been led again by the HMA, which has experienced more 
rapid price increases than the rest of the country. The rise in the real housing prices during the 
2000s has raised questions regarding the sustainability of the price development, and the 
ongoing global financial crisis and recession has again turned prices on a downward slope in 
the beginning of 2008. However, in the HMA, prices have this time proved more resilient 
than in the rest of the country.  
2.5.1 Finnish household preferences regarding housing consumption 
In this section we will go through the conclusions in Juntto’s (2007) research on the 
preferences of Finnish consumers regarding their housing market consumption. The data is 
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collected from 3,455 households in personal interviews and the overall representativeness is 
high. In the following, we will briefly summarize the themes of most interest to analysis of 
rental yields. 
Overall, Finns have a strong preference (86% of respondents) for owner-occupancy as soon as 
they are financially in a position to take a mortgage. However, almost 40% of Finns live in 
rental apartments, and most of the low-income households live in rental dwellings. Owner-
occupancy is amongst all survey participants considered a cheap alternative to renting, and a 
dwelling is also considered a good investment 
Over a third of tenants in rental dwellings state that the primary reason for their tenure choice 
is the inability to buy a house due to low income or problems with saving the required 
mortgage down payment. This offers support for the argument that housing markets are in 
fact heavily segmented with low-income citizens flocking in the low-end of the housing 
market without an opportunity to freely choose between tenure choices. Also small niche-
groups, such as students (94% of them tenants), are a recognizable part of the rental market.  
The number of small households is increasing constantly as the average size of households 
declines. This macro-level trend should support the price appreciation and rental demand for 
the stock of housing with less rooms and smaller floor areas. On the other hand, for the 
wealthy deciles, the number of households living in detached houses has increased and 
detached houses are generally felt a more desired form of housing than before. 
However, changes could occur rapidly, because Finns move quite often and over 25% of the 
survey respondents stated that they had planned moving in the near future (Juntto 2007). 
Housing decisions are made on comparing a rather small set of alternatives and decisions are 
mainly based on other than financial considerations. 
 
3 Methodology & hypotheses 
In this section we discuss the construction of the hedonic models employed in this study. We 
will first run through general issues on the choice of functional form and then proceed to 
choose a functional form to be used in this study. 
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3.1 Functional form 
Much of research on hedonic models builds on the early work by Lancaster (1966), Rosen 
(1974) and Maclennan (1977). The models, as suggested by the name, are models which 
focus on analyzing the demand and prices for different sources of pleasure. These different 
sources of pleasure combine to characterize heterogeneous commodities in terms of their 
‘quality’ (Sheppard 1999). In the analysis of housing, quality and pleasure should be 
understood, in a broad sense, as all of the attributes that make up the value of a house: 
location, size, condition, neighborhood, etc. 
The standard approach to the analysis of housing prices by estimating a hedonic price 
function has been to adopt a parametrical approach. In this approach, a functional form for the 
price  function  is  determined,  after  which  a  finite  number  of  parameters  are  chosen  and  
estimated to best determine the value of that function. These parameters reflect, or proxy, the 
hedonic attributes that form the demand for the house, and the coefficients represent estimates 
of the implicit prices of these attributes. The fundamental hedonic equation (Malpezzi 2003) 
is 
 ? = ?(?,?, ?,?,?), (9) 
where  R  =  rent  (substitute  V,  value),  S  =  structural  characteristics,  N  =  neighborhood  
characteristics, L = location within the market, C = contract conditions or characteristics and 
T = the time rent or value is observed. However, the actual functional form of the equation is 
subject to much debate. Economic theory does not place restrictions on the functional form of 
hedonic equations. However, the model must include land values, which depend on location 
(Sheppard 1997) and the equations should be convex (Jones 1988). They should also account 
for the number of public goods or amenities available (Parsons 1990).  
In their 1981 paper, “The Choice of Functional Forms for Hedonic Equations”, Halvorsen and 
Pollakowski  were  one  of  the  first  to  propose  the  choice  of  functional  form  to  be  based  on  
relevant statistical procedures, rejecting all of the most commonly used functional forms until 
then. They specify a highly general form that includes two different Box-Cox transformations 
and interaction terms. This quadratic Box-Cox functional form incorporates all other 
functional forms of interest as special cases and is thus highly flexible.  
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Cassel and Mendelsohn (1985) comment on the article by Halvorsen and Pollakowski. They 
provide an interesting discussion on the choice of functional form for hedonic price equations. 
They state that choosing the optimal functional form includes a tradeoff that depends on the 
purported use of the function. If predicting total house values is the main goal, the form that 
provides the best fit (typically the most flexible model) is quite appropriate, however this 
form may be suboptimal if information on the relative importance, or weight, of the different 
attributes is of interest. Though it may have less predictive power, some other functional form 
may be able to compensate for its shortcoming by providing more stable parameter estimates 
and a more intuitive interpretation. 
Further commenting on the same subject, Cropper, Deck and McConnell (1988) investigate 
the issue of model selection. By simulation, they evaluate linear, log-linear, quadratic, linear 
Box-Cox and quadratic Box-Cox models on both predictive power and how well the model 
estimates marginal effects. Their analysis shows that in situations where some important 
variables were omitted or observed imprecisely, the simpler forms such as the linear Box-
Cox, the linear, the semi-log and the double-log perform the best, while the quadratic and the 
Box-Cox  quadratic  forms  performs  the  worst.  As  a  conclusion,  they  advocate  the  Box-Cox  
linear form for having the smallest average bias, though the linear form produces the smallest 
maximum bias. 
In his 2003 paper, Malpezzi reviews the major issues related to hedonic models and their 
applications. Regarding the functional form, he finds it “particularly problematic that theory 
yields little guidance to the functional form of the hedonic relationship.” He compares the 
virtues of the linear form, the log-linear form, the translog form and the Box-Cox forms, but 
makes no conclusion about which is most suitable. Instead, he quotes Maclennan (1977) by 
stating that “the design of the pricing model should fit the purpose at hand.” 
In choosing the functional form to use in our paper, we will begin by performing explorative 
analysis using linear Box-Cox specification, allowing for different transformation parameters 
for the dependent variable and the independent variables (termed ? and ? respectively). The 
analysis will be done for a restricted sample (namely the Helsinki exact matched sample) in 
an attempt to ensure best possible comparability of fit. On the basis of this analysis, we will 
attempt to choose a functional form that provides a good combination of fit, stability and 
intuition. Additionally, we will use the linear form to verify the results and ensure that they 
provide intuitive explanations for the coefficients. For example Arimah (1996) and Laakso 
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(1992) arrive at using the double-log with similar reasoning (combination of interpretation, 
significance  and  stability).  Laakso  also  performs  Box-Cox  tests  and  concludes  that  “the  
results did not change the main conclusions based on the results of log linear models.” 
3.2 Choice of functional form to be used in this study 
In this section, we will choose a functional form by performing explorative analysis using the 
linear Box-Cox specification as discussed earlier in section 3.1. 
The Box-Cox transformation is a parametric transformation method (Box and Cox 1964) that 
aims to ensure that the usual assumptions5 of linear regression models hold: 
  ?(?) =  ? ?? –  1????(?)???? , ?? ? ? 0
??(?) log? , ?? ? = 0 ? (10) 
where ? is the transformation parameter and GM(y) is the geometric mean of y. 
According to Draper and Cox (1969), even in cases where the power transformation does not 
give an exact normal distribution, the usual estimates of the transformation parameter ? will 
lead to a distribution that satisfies certain restrictions on the first four moments6, meaning it 
will  usually  be  symmetric.  The  transformation  parameter  can  be  optimized  in  two  different  
ways: maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and the Bayesian method. In both methods, ?, 
which minimizes the residual sum of squares, is obtained. There exist two special cases of the 
Box-Cox: When ? = 1, the transformation is reduced to a linear function, and when ? = 0, it 
forms a logarithmic transformation according to the L’Hôpital rule: 
 lim
???
??? ? 1??
?
=  lim
???
???? ? 1?
??1 = lim??? ?? × ln ? = ln ? (11) 
                                               
5 y ~ N(X?, ?2In) 
6 (1) linearity of the relationship, (2) independence of the errors, (3) homoscedasticity (versus (i) time as well as 
the (ii) predictions) and (4) normality of the error distribution 
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We begin with the general form without interaction terms, proposed by Halvorsen and 
Pollakowski (1979), with the coefficients ?0 to ?i as well as the transformation parameters ? 
and ? to be estimated: 
 
?(?) =  ?? +??????
???
+ ??  (12) 
Definitions as follows: 
Y = net rental yield 
? = transformation parameter for dependent variable 
? = transformation parameter for independent variables 
X = the vector of independent variables 
?i = the vector of coefficients for the variables i 
m = number of independent variables (12) 
? = error term 
For this analysis, X includes twelve variables altogether: size of the apartment, distance from 
Helsinki city center, age (dummy), dwelling type (dummy) and annual dummies. All the 
chosen variables have broad support in literature. We use a restricted sample of exact matched 
cases in Helsinki (2140 cases), which is the highest quality subset in terms of amount of 
matches and data available. 
As a result of the maximum likelihood estimation for the general form, we obtain values for ? 
= -0.235 and ? = 0.421. They are both significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level, with 
a log likelihood of 7159.9. We then perform the same estimation, but imposing a constraint 
where ? = ? and get ? =  0.041.  These  results  are  not  significant  at  the  0.1  level,  with  a  log  
likelihood of 7135.1. Both the likelihood ratio test and the pseudo R-squared test show that 
there is only a very small difference between goodness of fit for the two specifications in 
favor of the unconstrained specification. We choose the constrained form and choose to set ? 
= 0. Thus, as our study does not intend to forecast but rather explain, we favor the intuitive 
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interpretations for the coefficients of the logarithmic (double-log) transformations (see 
equation (11)) to get equation (13), similarly to Laakso (1992) and Arimah (1996). 
 ln? = ?? + ? ln? + ??, (13) 
where ? is the vector of coefficients ?1 to ?i. If the constant and error term are defined as 
logarithms as well, the equation takes the double-log form: 
 ln? = ln?? + ? ln? + ln ?? , (14) 
which is used is used as the regression specification in the regression analyses in section 5.4. 
By taking exponents of both sides, we obtain: 
 ? = ??????  (15) 
The benefit of this form is that we can choose to either regress the net rental yield directly, or 
to regress its constituents separately, as follows: 
 ? = ?????? (16) 
 ? = ?????? (17) 
where ? and ? are the coefficient vectors for dependent variable rent (R) and price (P) 
respectively. When net rental yield is defined Y = R/P (and thus (15) = (16) / (17)), we get: 
 ? =  (??/??) × ???? × (??/??) (18) 
Where ?0/?0 = x0, ?i - ?i = x0 and ?R / ?P = ?Y. Separating the regression analyses for rent and 
price arrives at the same result but with the benefit of allowing for separation of rental yield 
into the constituents, giving possible further insight into the factors driving rental yield. 
 
?? = ??+  ???? + ??
???
 (19) 
3.3 Hypotheses 
Tian (2008), Garner and Verbrugge (2009) and Hargreaves (2005) have found that there 
exists significant variation in the residential capitalization rate between dwellings of different 
  37 
 
value. All of the authors have noted that the squared value of a house has a negative relation 
to observed rents. Therefore, our first hypothesis is:  
H1: There is a negative relation between the net rental yield and house value.    
To test H1, the data will be split into deciles according to dwelling price to see how net rental 
yields differ between the deciles. Additionally, the data will be plotted into a net rental yield 
on price scatterplot. Finally a simple regression test will be performed, with price and price 
squared as the independent variables and rent as the dependent variable. 
If H1 is true, it follows directly that the price and rent of a dwelling cannot be set according to 
the same formula. Moreover, for net rental yield to decrease for higher priced dwellings, one 
of the following must be true: 
1. Potential buyers value some of the dwelling-specific characteristics7 of higher priced 
dwellings more positively than renters do. 
2. Potential  tenants  value  some  of  the  dwelling-specific  characteristics  of  lower  priced  
dwellings more positively than buyers do. 
If on a general level either one of the above is true on an aggregate level, it implies that the 
elasticities in the hedonic price and rent functions differ. Therefore, we arrive at our second 
hypothesis: 
H2: Differing elasticities in the hedonic price and rent functions drive the variation in 
net rental yield. 
H2 will be tested using a regression analysis, where the dependent variable is either net rental 
yield, annual net rent or debt-free ask price and the independent variables are all the dwelling 
specific variables available in our dataset. 
 
                                               
7 The dwelling-specific characteristics can be either structural, location or neighborhood variables. 
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4 Data description 
In this section we outline the data we use to analyze the variation in net rental yields. First, we 
summarize the data from Oikotie, the provider of the dwelling advertisements, and second, we 
go through the matching process; how the sample of matched pairs of rental and for-sale 
advertisement is derived. Then, we briefly describe the sources of other variables, present 
descriptive statistics for the full sample and subsets of data, and conclude the section by 
discussing the potential limitations of the data.     
4.1 Our dataset 
Our data is gathered from Oikotie, one of the two largest Finnish web-based marketplaces for 
apartments and properties for sale and for rent. Oikotie is owned by Sanoma Oyj, a Finnish 
media conglomerate. Our dataset consists of 31,864 matched pairs (used synonymously with 
cases) of advertisements for rental and ownership housing units during the time period 2002-
2009. 
The data has been compiled from the whole database of Oikotie advertisements, with 937,070 
entries and 123 fields altogether (each entry is an advertisement and each field is a descriptive 
attribute to the entries, such as size of apartment, number of rooms, the date of the 
advertisement or a free text field). To our knowledge, the Oikotie database in its entirety has 
not previously been used for academic studies of housing prices, rents or rental yields. 
The sample itself has been created by matching advertisements for rental dwellings with 
advertisements for ownership dwellings. There are two categories of matched cases; exact 
matches and similar matches. Next, we will describe the matching process and the 
characteristics of the two classes of cases. 
4.1.1 Dwelling-specific fields in the Oikotie database 
As mentioned above, the Oikotie database contains 123 fields altogether. However, not all of 
these fields are of interest in this study, and they were removed from the sample at an early 
phase. The fields used in this study are described in Table 1. 
  39 
 
Table 1: 
Oikotie data fields 
This table presents the matching criteria that were used to match the rental advertisements to the for sale 
advertisements in the Oikotie dataset. 
Description 
Dwelling type (apartment / row-house or two-family house / single family house) 
Zip code where the dwelling is located 
The city where the dwelling is located 
Street address 
Year when the dwelling was originally built 
Size of the dwelling (m2) 
Monthly rent of dwelling 
The debt-free asking price of the dwelling 
Maintenance and upkeep costs per month 
Number of rooms 
Description of dwelling 
Advertisement publishing date 
Advertisement publishing end 
 
 
4.1.2 Matching process 
The matching process  was begun using the cleaned up version of the original database, which 
included 817,120 advertisements. Most of the removed cases were advertisements for 
subsidized housing, which are out of the scope of this study. Entries missing relevant fields 
(e.g. sales price or date of publishing) or showing indications of the data having been entered 
incorrectly (e.g. sales price over 100 million Euros) were removed from the data. The refined 
data includes 165 287 rental ads and 651 833 for sale ads. Figure 3 summarizes the matching 
process. 
The matching was done according to some binding conditions with exact fit required as well 
as baskets of criteria and conditions where an approximate match was considered sufficient. 
First, a rental advertisement was taken, and then a for sale advertisement was chosen to match 
it. Table 2 summarizes the matching criteria and how the matching was done according to the 
given criteria. 
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Table 2: 
Matching criteria 
This  table  presents  the  matching  criteria  that  were  used  to  match the rental advertisements to the for sale 
advertisements in the Oikotie dataset. 
Criterion Match type Description Basket 1 Basket 2 Basket 3 
Zip code Exact         
Apartment 
type Basket   Apartments 
Row houses / 
two-family 
houses 
Single-family 
houses 
Floor number Basket Only for apartments Bottom floor 
Everything in 
between Top floor 
Number of 
rooms Basket 
Total number of 
rooms, 
(bedrooms + 
other) 
One room Two room Three rooms or more 
Construction 
year Basket   Prior to 1961 1961-1983 After 1983 
Floor area Range 
Maximum 
deviation 10 % 
(logarithmic) 
      
Advertisement 
date period 
Exact 
(overlap) 
At least one day 
of simultaneous 
time online 
      
 
 
After the initial matching was done, rental ads that matched the criteria for more than one for 
sale ads were analyzed further according to the refined matching criteria (Table 3) which also 
included searching for the closest match according to two criteria. 
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Table 3: 
Refined matching criteria 
This table presents the refined matching criteria that were used after the initial matching of the Oikotie 
advertisements if a single match was not identified. 
Criterion Match type Description 
House address Exact If only one match found, that match was chosen, otherwise proceed to next step 
Floor area Closest If only one match found, that match was chosen, otherwise proceed to next step 
Year of 
construction Closest 
If only one match found, that match was chosen, otherwise 
proceed to next step 
Random pick None One of the remaining matches chosen at random 
 
 
After the two matching processes were completed, matches where two rental dwellings’ 
advertisements had been matched to the same for sale advertisement were removed to make 
the matching procedure independent of which way it  was done (rent to sale or sale to rent).  
The data included a sample of 32,763 matched cases. Of these, 4,747 were exact matches, 
where  both  all  of  the  above  mentioned  criteria  and  the  address  (full  address,  not  the  house  
address which leaves ambiguity in multi-family dwellings) were exactly matched, suggesting 
that they were the same house that had been announced for rent and for sale simultaneously. 
In addition to the exact matches, 11,616 were matches that were on the same street. 
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Figure 3: 
Matching methodology 
Figure 3 summarizes the matching methodology used to create the sample of data. The initial screening, where 
all criteria are binding, is followed by the selection process, where the best possible unique fit is chosen. 
 
 
4.1.3 Outlier analysis 
As a final step in creating the sample, an outlier analysis was performed. Altogether 899 cases 
were removed. The outlier analysis consisted of three parts. First, cases that were the only 
entry within their zip code were removed (177 cases). Second, cases whose price or rent per 
square meter differed significantly from the rest in their zip code were removed (679 cases) 
and finally, a manual outlier analysis was done for the highest and lowest rental yields, 
removing  cases  (43  in  total)  where  the  free-text  field  revealed  them to  be  unsuitable  to  the  
sample (e.g., flat let out on a per day basis, asking rent was per tenant, not flat). 
4.1.4 Other dwelling specific data: Google Maps 
In addition to the Oikotie data, dwelling specific data was retrieved concerning location 
variables. For this, the coordinates of all of the addresses of the apartments were obtained 
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from Google’s Maps service. The coordinates were then used to determine the variables 
presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: 
Google Maps data fields 
This table presents the data fields obtained using Google’s Maps service (http://maps.google.com). The distances 
between the locations are calculated using the haversine formula (see equation (20)). 
Description 
Distance to closest of the five metropolitan areas’ city centers 
Distance to the closest university campus (15 campuses altogether) 
Distance to the closest commuter rail station (metro or train, only HMA) 
 
 
The distances between the coordinates were calculated using the haversine formula, which 
measures the distance along the surface of a sphere. 
 
???????? ?
?
?
? = ????????(?? ???) + ???(??) cos(??)????????(??) (20) 
where: 
haversin = the haversine function 
d = distance between the two points, along a great circle of the sphere 
R = radius of the sphere 
?1 = is the latitude of point 1 
?2 = is the latitude of point 2 
?? = longitude separation 
4.1.5 Area variables 
In addition to the dwelling specific data from Oikotie and Google, two other sources of data 
are mainly used: Statistics Finland, which provides data that covers the entire Finland, and the 
City of Helsinki Urban Facts database, which includes more detailed neighborhood-level data 
on the Helsinki Metropolitan Area.  
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Statistics Finland8, the Finnish public authority established for the purpose of gathering 
statistics, produces the vast majority of official Finnish statistics. We used Statfin for data on 
median incomes, town level unemployment and population growth. 
The City of Helsinki Urban Facts9 is a result of the merging of the Helsinki City Statistical 
Office and the City Archives in 1990. In this study we use City of Helsinki Urban Facts data 
on area average income, unemployment rates, share of dwelling types by tenure form (owner 
occupier, renter, subsidized renter or owner) and number of dwellings by tenure form. These 
data are only available for the Helsinki metropolitan area, about half of our total sample 
(15,478 cases).  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
In this section, we will describe the dataset, which is formed as described in the previous 
section.  We will  show the  distribution  of  the  dataset  as  well  as  mean values  of  certain  key  
variables. Finally, we will discuss some potential biases present in the data. 
4.2.1 Annual distribution of data 
As shown in Figure 5, the number of observations is heavily weighted towards the end of the 
sample period. This is mainly explained by the relative novelty of advertising dwellings on 
the Internet. 
                                               
8 http://stat.fi 
9 http://www.hel2.fi/tietokeskus/eng/index.html 
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Figure 4: 
Quarterly distribution of the dataset 
This figure shows the quarterly distribution of the cases within the period of analysis. As can be seen, data from 
the first years (2002-2004) is quite limited and most of the cases fall in the latter years. The data was retrieved 
halfway through Q4 of 2009, which explains the drop in observations. 
 
4.2.2 Geographical distribution of data 
The data has been grouped into five metropolitan areas (Helsinki, Tampere, Turku, Oulu and 
Jyväskylä) reflecting the largest cities and metropolitan areas in the country10 (Espoo is  the  
second largest and Vantaa the fourth, but they are included in the Helsinki metropolitan area). 
Lahti is almost the same size as Jyväskylä, but was left out as an independent metropolitan 
area due to its proximity to Helsinki, as it would have been unclear which cities between 
Helsinki and Lahti fall into either category. As can be seen from Figure 5, the representation 
of the sample is best in the Helsinki and  Turku metropolitan areas, while in the Tampere 
metropolitan area, the number of cases is slightly lower in relation to population, and in the 
Oulu and Jyväskylä metropolitan areas, the relation is significantly lower. 
                                               
10 Source: http://kunnat.net 
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Figure 5: 
Geographical distribution of the dataset 
This figure shows the geographical distribution of the cases within the period of analysis. The number of cases is 
on the left vertical axis and black bars, while population is on the right with gray bars. It  can be seen that the 
Helsinki and Turku metropolitan areas are best represented in the sample, while the Tampere metropolitan area 
is slightly underrepresented and Oulu and Jyväskylä are strongly underrepresented. 
 
4.3 Potential biases & limitations of data 
In this section, we present the potential biases and limitations that are posed by using the 
advertisement dataset. The most obvious potential biases are caused by the use of ask prices 
instead of realized prices and the lack of data on vacancy rates. The major limitations are the 
lack of supply side variables and the inability to distinguish between institutional versus 
individual investors. 
4.3.1 Ask prices 
Because of using advertisement data, there are potential problems concerning the use of the 
asking prices and rents advertised online, and not using realized prices from, e.g., tax records 
or rental contracts. However, in the context of this study it is essentially irrelevant if a 
systematic bias exists among the individuals and institutions expressing their view on the 
value  or  rent  of  a  certain  dwelling.  For  example,  if  all  prices  were  inflated  by  10%  to  set  
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prices higher before price negotiations, the rental yield curve would merely shift upwards, and 
not affect the variation between rental yields. Therefore, we assume that, even if the asking 
prices or rents were biased, the bias would be similar across all dwellings.      
4.3.2 Vacancy rates 
As discussed already in section 2.2.3, vacancy rates have been found to have significant but at 
times conflicting effects on market rents. Further precision about local vacancy rates would 
enable us to capture the realizeable net rental yield more effectively, and large deviations 
between vacancy rates of different dwelling types could potentially drive the differences in 
our observed net rental yields. Theoretically, correction for vacancy rate should of course be 
included in the net rental yield, but in our study, only cross-sectional variation of vacancy 
rates would have an effect on results, and therefore, we have not attempted to take them into 
account. 
4.3.3 Supply side variables 
As discussed earlier in section 2.3.2, Chichernea et al. (2008) suggest that the supply side 
constraints are powerful determinants for the variation in the apartment capitalization rates 
across metropolitan areas. However, this study does not incorporate supply side variables, 
such as data on construction permits, new housing construction starts, number of available 
lots for new construction, constraint indices or other variables, which could potentially 
capture cross-sectional differences in net rental yields. However, even finding such 
metropolitan-level data in Finland is difficult, and its application to the neighborhood-level 
would require even more detailed data.    
4.3.4 Institutional versus individual investors 
Sirmans and Benjamin (1991) find that professional property management has a significantly 
positive effect on rents. Our research makes no distinction whether the advertisements are 
entered by institutional investors, individual investors or households with any other 
idiosyncratic reasons for announcing a dwelling for rent or for sale. The origin of the 
advertisement could be hypothesized to have an effect on the ask prices, as property investors 
could be expected to pursue more analytical methods in their price setting decisions than 
ordinary small investors, who make a major share of the privately-financed rental housing 
markets. Secondly, if the price setting is done using this kind of systematic method, there 
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should not exist significant cross-sectional variation of effective net rental yields. Support for 
the notion that institutional investors consider yields while setting prices and rents can be 
found in the data: by examining some of the newly built properties where multiple apartments 
are offered for sale and rent simultaneously, it can be seen that though the apartments are of 
very different price and rent, their net rental yield is exactly the same and has been set at a 
round figure. 
 
5 Results 
In this section we present the results of our analysis. We begin by showing the mean net rental 
yields over time, compared to interest rates and between housing submarkets in Finland. We 
then proceed to confirm the hypothesis of negative relationship between rents and dwelling 
prices. Finally, we present the results of the regression analyses and explain the sources of the 
variance in net rental yield extending beyond the mere rent-value relationship. 
5.1 Mean net rental yield over time 
Figure 6 shows that mean net rental yields have generally decreased in Finland over the 
period stretching from 2002 to 2009. As housing prices have continuously increased during 
the observation period, one can interpret the overall decline as the result of rents falling 
behind the high price appreciation markets. Until the second half of 2005, the net rental yield 
followed the decline in the long-term interest rate somewhat closely. The recent sharp decline 
of short term interest rates and simultaneous increase in house prices has pushed the net rental 
yield lower again. 
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Figure 6: 
Quarterly mean net rental yield 
Figure 6 shows the quarterly mean net rental yield for Helsinki and other areas from 2002 to the third quarter of 
2009. Other series on the left hand side axis include the average new mortgage rate (mainly based on 3 and 12 
month euribor rate and a mortgage default premium) and the 10yr Treasury rate. Price index of old apartments 
and row houses is plotted on the right hand side axis.       
 
 
From Figure 6, one can note that during the 2002-2008 period there has been relatively long 
periods when the out-of-pocket user costs have been well below the gross rents. This can be 
interpreted to result from the spread between the new mortgage rate and net rental yield. 
During the four years before 2007, it was generally much cheaper to own than rent. In the 
Helsinki region, the mortgage rate crossed the net rental yield at the beginning of 2007, 
implying owner occupancy to be more costly tenure for households buying into the market at 
that time. However, Himmelberg et al. (2005), among many others, argue that it is more 
fruitful to compare net capitalization rate with the long term interest rate, as done in Figure 6. 
Bearing in mind the average mortgage premium of 50-150 basis points, the deviation of the 
synthetic long-term mortgage rate from the rental equivalence is not at all dramatic. 
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Figure 7: 
Mean net rental yield by metropolitan area 
This figure shows the annual mean net rental yield from 2002 to the third quarter of 2009 by six different 
metropolitan areas. Due to low number of observations, data for Oulu and Jyväskylä  is not shown prior to 2004.  
Following Figure 7, there is clear graphical evidence that the size of the market decreases 
capitalization rates. The Helsinki metropolitan area offers consistently lower mean yields, and 
areas outside the 5 main metropolitan areas have yields almost 1.5% higher than those in 
Helsinki. The recent increase in capitalization rates in Oulu seems somewhat surprising, but 
due to a relatively small number of observations (prior to 2008) this is hard to analyze. There 
are only around 50 recorded cases in the Oulu region during 2005 and 2006, which makes 
potential data error plausible. 
5.2 Net rental yield as a function of dwelling price 
As discussed in section 2.3.1, net rental yield and asset value have been found to have a 
negative relationship. Figure 8 plots the normalized net rental yield against the debt free price 
in thousands of euros for all of the matches in our sample. Graphical support for the convex 
relationship is seen in the figure. Net rental yields tilt heavily towards the low-end of the 
market with a long tail of low yields extending to the high-value end. The basic form of the 
relationship looks logarithmic at a glance. In addition to the general shape of the curve, it is 
striking to note the complete absence of high-yielding assets in the very expensive end of the 
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market. Low-rent bargains are available throughout the value axis, but even the lowest yields 
rise when approaching the less expensive end. 
Figure 8: 
Net rental yield as a function of dwelling price 
Figure 8 plots the net rental yield against the debt free ask price in thousands of EUR. Net rental yield 
observations from 2002-2008 are normalized according to quarterly average yields. Altogether 31,864 
observations are included. 
 
 
Furthermore, as can be seen from Figure 9, the phenomenon is consistent when the dataset is 
broken down into the six different geographical areas. It should be noted that in areas outside 
of Helsinki, there are less expensive dwellings due to land values being lower, but 
nevertheless, the yields fall strongly as debt free ask price increases. This gives further 
support for the notion that the variation is not due to differences between geographical areas 
but is inherent in the Finnish housing market generally. 
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Figure 9: 
Net rental yield as a function of dwelling price in different geographies 
The six panels in Figure 9 plot the net rental yield against the debt free ask price in thousands of EUR for the six 
geographical subsamples Helsinki, Jyväskylä, Oulu, Tampere and Turku areas as well as Rest of Finland. Net 
rental yield observations from 2002-2008 are normalized according to quarterly average yields. Altogether 
31,864 observations are included, with 16,980 observations in Helsinki area, 594 in Jyväskylä, 631 in Oulu, 
1,705 in Tampere, 3,575 in Turku and 5,134 in Rest of Finland. 
 
 
Breaking the sample down even further, the phenomenon shows consistency even within very 
small geographical subareas. Figure 10 shows the distribution of net rental yields as a 
function  of  debt  free  ask  price  in  Kallio,  an  urban  district  of  Helsinki  located  near  the  city  
center. Kallio (00530 Helsinki) was chosen because it is geographically a small and 
homogenous area, where the land prices are not likely to vary greatly and because the sample 
contains a large amount of cases from that area. 
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Figure 10: 
Net rental yield as a function of dwelling price in Kallio, a Helsinki district 
Figure 10 plots  the  net  rental  yield  against  the  debt  free  ask  price  in  thousands  of  EUR  for  Kallio,  an  urban  
district in Helsinki. Net rental yield observations from 2002-2008 are normalized according to quarterly average 
yields. Altogether 933 observations are included. 
 
 
 
The complete dataset is divided into value deciles in Table 6. Examination of the mean yields 
lends further support to the hypothesis that the yields decrease as dwelling prices increase. 
Performing ANOVA analysis for differences in all means yields an F-statistic of almost 4000, 
hence the means are statistically significantly different from each other. The decline in mean 
yields is monotonic and consistent, although the minimums and maximums do not show a 
similarly consistent pattern. However, considering our sample size, the latter observation is 
not surprising.  Importantly, standard deviations do not vary much either.    
Average net rental yield for the least expensive decile is 4.0 % higher than for the most 
expensive decile, and a shift from dwellings costing 100,000 euros (4th decile) to over 
200,000 euros (9th decile) decreases the net yield by 1.3%. In (pre-tax) money terms this 
translates to monthly savings of over 200 euros for the tenants of expensive dwellings, or 
similarly, smaller implicit cashflows earned by the owner-occupiers.         
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Table 5: 
Mean net rental yield by dwelling price deciles 
Table 5 below presents descriptive statistics of mean normalized net rental yield by dwelling price deciles.       
  Debt free price (000 EUR)   Normalized Net Rental Yield 
 Min Max Mean StDev  Min Max Mean StDev 
1st decile 14 59 45 10   0.031 0.188 0.080 0.017 
2nd decile 59 76 68 5   0.023 0.181 0.065 0.011 
3rd decile 76 90 83 4   0.022 0.199 0.060 0.010 
4th decile 90 107 98 5   0.021 0.167 0.056 0.009 
5th decile 107 123 115 5   0.026 0.158 0.053 0.009 
6th decile 123 140 132 5   0.016 0.122 0.050 0.009 
7th decile 140 165 152 7   0.016 0.117 0.048 0.008 
8th decile 165 198 180 10   0.019 0.121 0.046 0.009 
9th decile 198 269 229 20   0.017 0.121 0.043 0.010 
10th decile 269 1720 409 170   0.013 0.109 0.040 0.011 
 
 
 
To further support the argument for the negative relationship between net rental yield and 
value, we run the following OLS regression for net rent on the debt free price of the dwelling:   
 ?? = ? +???? + ????? + ? (21) 
where  Ri is  the  annual  net  rent  of  the  dwelling,  Pi is the debt free price of the matched 
dwelling and ? is an identically and independently distributed disturbance. Previous literature 
discussed in 2.3.1 has found ?1 to be positive and ?2 to be negative. 
Table 6 presents the results for the regression analysis. Squared prices receive a negative 
coefficient as expected, and all results are significant at the 1% level. In addition, one can 
observe a decrease in the baseline rent as the number of rooms increases: the decreasing 
constant term in columns 1-3 suggests that the “base” rent falls slightly from 160 to 148 euros 
per month as the number of rooms grows from one to three or more. The squared price 
coefficient is smaller in the complete sample, which is likely to be attributable to more 
distributed observations and shorter relative range. The results for the exact match sample are 
very  similar  to  those  for  the  whole  sample,  suggesting  there  are  no  significant  biases  in  the  
whole sample attributable to the slightly different matching methodology. 
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Table 6: 
Regression results: annual net rent on price and price2 
Following equation (21), Table 6 presents the regression results of regressing annual net rent on dwelling price 
(1000 EUR) and price (1000 EUR) squared. Columns 1-3 represent separate regressions for apartments with one 
room, two rooms and three or more rooms, and the fourth column the regression for the whole data. The fifth 
column represents the regression for the data set of exact matches only. The figures in parentheses represent t-
values. All coefficients are significant at the 1 % level. 
  1 room 2 room 3+ rooms Combined Exact matches 
Constant 1909.04 1876.27 1779.96 1810.20 1990.90 
  (66.49) (57.46) (25.08) (78.21) (45.51) 
Price 35.57 34.78 36.96 34.94 33.36 
  (90.39) (97.35) (88.40) (190.47) (67.21) 
Price^2 -0.0193 -0.0171 -0.0076 -0.0058 -0.0086 
  (-17.39) (-21.88) (-17.74) (-25.52) (-8.80) 
n 31864 31864 31864 31864 4747 
R² 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.79 
 
 
 
5.3 Net rental yield as a function of dwelling size 
Because dwelling price and dwelling size can be expected to show a strong positive 
relationship, it is natural to assume that net rental yield also decreases when dwelling size 
increases. Figure 11 depicts the distribution of net rental yields as a function of dwelling size 
in the whole of Finland. 
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Figure 11: 
Net rental yield as a function of dwelling size 
Figure 11 plots the net rental yield against the dwelling’s size in square meters. Net rental yield observations 
from 2002-2008 are normalized according to quarterly average yields. Altogether 31,864 observations are 
included. 
 
It can be seen that dwelling size does have a negative relationship with net rental yields, but 
that it is not as clearly decreasing as the relationship with debt free asking price. Due to the 
fact  that  land  prices  vary  so  greatly  across  the  country  and  even  single  cities,  the  price  of  
dwellings of the same size can vary greatly. This would suggest that dwelling price is a 
stronger driver of rental yields than size. 
On the other hand, within a single zip code, land prices can be expected to be relatively stable. 
Therefore we again turn our attention to Kallio in Helsinki. Figure 12 depicts net rental yield 
as a function of dwelling price in Kallio and as can be seen, net rental yields fall as dwelling 
size increases. As the value of the lot that the (in Kallio, predominantly apartment building) 
structures  are  on  is  divided  proportional  to  the  size  of  the  dwelling,  a  larger  dwelling  
implicitly contains a proportionally equal amount of land value as a smaller one. Therefore, it 
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seems quite unlikely that land leverage, or the fact that land does not depreciate, would 
explain more than a very modest part of the variation in rental yields. 
 
Figure 12: 
Net rental yield as a function of dwelling size in Kallio, a Helsinki district 
Figure 12 plots the net rental yield against the dwelling’s size in square meters for Kallio, an urban district in 
Helsinki. Net rental yield observations from 2002-2008 are normalized according to quarterly average yields. 
Altogether 933 observations are included. 
 
 
5.4 Determinants of rents, prices and net rental yield 
Although rents and prices both can be modeled by hedonic models, as discussed earlier, the 
coefficients for the models need not be exactly the same for both dependent variables. This 
also  results  in  variation  of  the  net  rental  yield,  the  quotient  of  rent  and  price.  Tables  in  the  
next section present the results of regression analyses where the dependent variable is one of 
these three factors. As mentioned earlier, all regression specifications follow equation (14). 
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This section will present some final information on the regression variables and interpreting 
them. 
In the regresssion analysis, the sample size has been reduced to 27,719 for the whole country 
dataset and 15,129 for the HMA sample due to unavailability of data from either Statistics 
Finland, Helsinki Urban Facts or on location (Google Maps). 
5.4.1 Variables in common to both samples 
All of the dwelling-specific variables in the regression analyses shown in this section are the 
same for both samples. Continuous variables that are in common to both are dwelling size as 
well as the distance variables. 
The dummy variables include a count of observations in each dummy class. The reference 
classes for the dummy variables are as follows: 
- Built before 1963 in the age dummy class 
- Floor in between (not top or bottom floor) in the floor number dummy class (not 
apartment is also a part of this class, meaning the dwelling is either a row house, two-
family house or a single family house) 
- Lot is owned in the lot ownership status class 
- Building has no lift in the lift dummy class 
5.4.2 Variables specific to each sample 
In addition to the metropolitan area dummies, there is one continuous variable specific to the 
whole country sample: 
- Town level unemployment rate (unemployed / workforce) 
In the Helsinki Area sample, the three sample-specific continuous variables are: 
- Area average income for areas roughly equivalent to zip codes 
- Area median advertisement period, the median duration of the publishing period of a 
dwelling advertisement on Oikotie in the area (as a proxy for liquidity / vacancy) 
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- Turnover of the dwelling type in the area: the number of rental advertisement in 2008 
to total number of rental housing of the same type in the area (as proxy for liquidity / 
vacancy) 
5.4.3 Interpreting the regression results 
As demonstrated by equation (14), the regression results are OLS regression coefficients for 
the logarithms of each of the variables, with dummy variables entering into the regression 
either  as  1  or  e1 (~2.718). An intuitive interpretation of the results can be gained by taking 
exponents of both sides of equation (14), arriving at equation (15), where the regression 
coefficients are the elasticities of each of the variables. A negative coefficient means that an 
increase in the parameter value will decrease the rent, price or net rental yield and vice versa. 
As discussed in section 3.2 and equation (18) in particular, an attractive property of the 
double-log specification is the translation of the coefficients for net rent and price to net rental 
yield. The coefficient for net rental yield is the coefficient for net rent minus the coefficient 
for price (with the exception of the constant, which is the quotient). However, the coefficients 
of net rental yield have been analyzed in separate regressions to ensure accuracy. 
5.5 Regression analyses 
In this section we will first interpret the results of the whole country sample and then compare 
them  to  the  results  of  the  HMA  sample.  Finally  we  will  evaluate  the  differences  more  
qualitatively. 
5.5.1 Net rental yield in the whole country sample 
Table 7 depicts the regression results for two OLS regressions with double-log specifications, 
with net rental yield as the dependent variable and the whole country sample as observations. 
In  the  table,  nearly  all  coefficients  are  significant  at  the  1  %  level  (and  even  at  the  0.1  %  
level), so no asterisks to indicate significance have been added. The first column of 
coefficients shows the first regression with no area variables, while the second column 
includes an the town level unemployment variable.  
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Table 7: 
Whole country sample: net rental yield 
Table 7 shows regression results for the whole country sample using a double-log regression specification, 
following equation (14). The dependent variable is net rental yield, and the coefficients in the first column 
include dependent variables without area specific continuous variables. The rows with a count (n of dummy) are 
dummy variables. The rightmost column includes town level unemployment, a zip code specific variable. As all 
coefficients except for the top floor dummy are significant at the 1 % level, asterisks marking significance have 
been left out. The effects of advertisement date (all significant at 1 % level except for 2008, which is expectedly 
very close to the reference class 2009) and metropolitan area (all significant at 1 % level) are displayed in Figure 
6 and Figure 7 respectively and therefore marked controlled here. 
Variable n of dummy Coefficients (t-stat in parentheses below the coefficient) 
dwelling size   -0.265   -0.264   
    (-78.45)   (-78.11)   
distance from center   0.033   0.034   
    (24.23)   (24.54)   
distance from university   0.034   0.034   
    (23.01)   (23.24)   
built 1962-1983 10605 0.064   0.067   
    (17.86)   (18.50)   
built 1983-2009 7614 -0.105   -0.101   
    (-25.69)   (-24.75)   
not apartment 2828 0.115   0.119   
    (22.54)   (23.19)   
bottom floor 3829 0.019   0.019   
    (4.86)   (4.92)   
top floor 4152 0.008   0.008   
    (2.19)   (2.22)   
lot is rented 571 0.018   0.017   
    (4.27)   (4.23)   
building has lift 3422 0.013   0.014   
    (4.47)   (4.51)   
town level unemployment       0.051   
        (6.15)   
advertisement date   Controlled   Controlled   
            
metropolitan area   Controlled   Controlled   
            
constant   -2.141   -2.004   
    (-157.61)   (-76.68)   
Adjusted R-squared   0.375   0.376   
n   27719   27719   
 
 
 
The regression analysis done for the whole country sample of 27,719 observations gives 
strong support for the hypothesis that rental yield is not constant throughout the housing 
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market, but that both dwelling specific as well as area characteristics have an effect on it. The 
full model’s explanatory power, measured by R-squared, is 0.376, compared to 0 were the 
null hypothesis to hold. The coefficients are analyzed in detail in the following list. 
i) Dwelling size  
Dwelling size, which is naturally highly correlated with the value of the dwelling, 
has the largest absolute value and has a strongly significant negative coefficient. 
ii) Distance from center / distance from university  
Distance from the city center and from the closest university both have 
significantly positive coefficients, meaning that the closer the dwelling is to any of 
these, the lower the rental yield. This is also in line with the hypothesis of net 
rental yield decreasing with value, as closeness to such locations typically raises 
the value of a dwelling. 
iii) Building age  
The two dummy classes representing the age of the building are also in line with 
the hypothesis that increased value of a dwelling decreases net rental yield: for the 
years 1962-1983, the era of lower quality building, the coefficient is significantly 
positive, while for 1983 onwards (new dwellings) the coefficient is significantly 
negative. 
iv) Row or single-family house (not apartment) / dwelling floor (top/in 
between/bottom)  
Interestingly, the dummy for not apartment (meaning the dwelling is either a row 
house, a two-family house or a single-family house) has a significantly positive 
coefficient. This finding is confirmed by a difference of means test (not presented 
in this paper) within some of the most observation-rich zip codes: apartment 
dwellings of the same size and even value seem to offer a lower net rental yield 
than respective row-houses and single-family houses. 
As may be expected, the bottom floor dummy has a significantly positive 
coefficient. Though its economic significance is limited, it is noteworthy that the 
effect on price and rent of being in the bottom floor is indeed significantly 
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negative  (Table  12  and  Table  13).  The  top-floor  dummy’s  coefficient  is  also  
positive, which is slightly unexpected, but its economic significance is lower still 
than that of the bottom floor dummy. 
A look at Table 12 and Table 13 shows that being on the top floor actually has a 
negative effect on both rent and price, which would be very surprising. As for the 
HMA sample this is not the case, it seems that this may not be a real phenomenon 
but rather a bias in the data, perhaps caused by the lack of a combined dummy for 
both having a lift and being on the top floor. However the limited amount of 
observations with both of these conditions prevents us from performing this kind 
of an analysis with this dataset.  
v) Rented or owned lot  
The dummy for rented lot is significantly positive, which is in line with the theory 
of land leverage explaining higher yields (assuming that rented lots are priced too 
low in terms of their real value), but its economic significance is limited, at around 
the same level as the bottom floor dummy. However, due to the low availability of 
data on the lot being rented or owned, these results are not as reliable as the other 
dummy classes. (Table 12 and Table 13 show that the signs for rent and price are 
also  in  line  with  the  land  leverage  theory:  rents  are  higher  but  prices  are  lower  
when the lot is rented.) 
vi) Lift  
Whether the building has a lift surprisingly has positive effect on rental yields, out 
of line with the hypothesis that positive attributes have a greater effect on price 
than on rent. Looking at Table 12 and Table 13 we can see that this indeed is the 
case: the effects on both rent and price is positive, but that on rent is stronger. 
Once again however, though statistically significant, the economic significance to 
net rental yield of having a lift is limited. 
vii) Unemployment rate in area  
The town level unemployment variable has a significantly positive coefficient. If 
high unemployment rate in the area is on average considered undesirable, this 
finding is consistent with net rental yield falling with value. On the other hand, 
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from a supply and demand perspective, this supports the hypothesis of high net 
rental yields in situations where the demand side is, for example, credit 
constrained, or may receive government subsidies to rental payments. Juntto’s 
(2007) findings about concentration of the low income households in the rental 
market support this argument. Looking at Table 12 and Table 13, we can see that 
rents are largely unaffected by the degree of unemployment (statistically 
insignificant positive effect), but that prices in areas with high unemployment are 
lower. 
viii) Advertisement date  
All of the advertisement year dummies except for 2008 have significant t-statistics. 
This is very much expected, because the rental yield has historically varied quite 
strongly as depicted by Figure 6. As the average yields in 2008 were very close to 
those of 2009, it is unsurprising that 2008 is insignificant. 
ix) Metropolitan area  
All of the metropolitan area dummies have statistically significant coefficients, and 
all of them except for the Rest of Finland area are positive. The reason for Rest of 
Finland being positive is the fact that the distance from center variable measures 
distance from the city centers of the five metropolitan areas and as Rest of Finland 
is by definition far away from any of those, the yield is already inflated. Figure 7 
depicts the average yields through time in the different metropolitan areas, without 
the control for distance from center. 
x) Constant  
The constant in the net rental yield regression is without interpretation, as it is 
merely one of the multipliers in equation (15). However, using the constant it is 
possible to obtain a predicted net rental yield by including attributes of a dwelling. 
As the focus of this study is on net rental yield, we will not offer a thorough interpretation of 
the coefficients of annual net rent or price. However, the results of the regression analyses for 
annual net rent and debt-free asking price in the whole country sample are presented in Table 
12 and Table 13. Additionally, a brief analysis of the key findings can be found in Table 9. 
Table 16 and Figure 15 present a regression analysis for net rental yield in the whole country 
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sample, where dwelling size is split into dummy variables, but this will be discussed more 
thoroughly in section 0 
5.5.2 Net rental yield in the HMA sample 
Table 8 depicts the regression results for four OLS regressions with double-log specifications, 
with net rental yield as the dependent variable and the HMA sample as observations. In the 
table, nearly all coefficients are significant at the 1 % level (and even at the 0.1 % level), so 
no asterisks to indicate significance have been added. The first column of coefficients shows 
the first regression with no area variables, while the second column includes an the town level 
unemployment variable.  
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Table 8: 
HMA sample: net rental yield 
Table 8 shows regression results for the HMA sample using a double-log regression specification, following 
equation (14). The dependent variable is net rental yield, and the coefficients in the first column include 
dependent variables without area specific continuous variables. The rows with a count (n of dummy) are dummy 
variables. The three rightmost columns include area specific variables. As all coefficients except floor dummies, 
lot is rented dummy and three lift coefficients are significant at the 1 % level, asterisks marking significance 
have been left out. The effect of advertisement date dummies (all significant at 1 % level except for 2008, which 
is expectedly close to the reference class 2009) are displayed in Figure 6 and therefore marked controlled here. 
Variable n of dummy Coefficients (t-stat in parentheses below the coefficient) 
dwelling size   -0.260 -0.252 -0.269 -0.262 
    (-64.44) (-62.66) (-52.32) (-64.97) 
distance from center   0.011 0.004 0.011 0.009 
    (5.67) (2.31) (5.74) (4.82) 
distance from rail stop   -0.025 -0.008 -0.026 -0.023 
    (-13.92) (-4.25) (-14.16) (-12.68) 
distance from university   0.068 0.058 0.069 0.067 
    (23.86) (20.31) (23.98) (23.39) 
built 1962-1983 4604 0.048 0.046 0.047 0.047 
    (10.18) (9.92) (10.00) (9.88) 
built 1983-2009 3263 -0.060 -0.061 -0.061 -0.058 
    (-10.92) (-11.21) (-11.08) (-10.59) 
not apartment 1280 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.179 
    (19.79) (20.00) (19.79) (21.66) 
bottom floor 1958 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.012 
    (2.46) (2.79) (2.44) (2.38) 
top floor 2204 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
    (-1.16) (-1.38) (-1.20) (-1.33) 
lot is rented 275 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 
    (1.96) (2.07) (1.99) (1.89) 
building has lift 2511  0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 
    (2.55) (2.25) (2.56) (2.61) 
area average income     -0.121     
      (-19.94)     
area median ad period       0.015   
        (2.59)   
area type turnover         -0.034 
          (-8.96) 
advertisement date   Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
            
constant   -2.163 -1.765 -2.163 -2.222 
    (-132.41) (-68.78) (-132.45) (-126.27) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.370 0.386 0.370 0.373 
n   15129 15129 15129 15129 
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With the HMA sample, a smaller but more consistent dataset including only one metropolitan 
area and thus major CBD we are able to offer further support to the hypothesis that net rental 
yield indeed is not constant but varies throughout the housing market, also within a single 
metropolitan area. The four R-squared’s of the four different set-ups vary between 0.370 and 
0.386, compared to 0 were the null hypothesis to hold. The individual coefficients are 
analyzed in the following list,  but as the vast  majority of the HMA coefficients are alike to 
those in the whole country sample, the focus will be on the differences between the results for 
the two samples. Two or more area variables (vii, viii, ix) were not included simultaneously 
due to strong multicollinearity, which makes the distinction of separate effects of each 
variable difficult. 
i) Dwelling size  
Similar effect as in whole country sample. 
ii) Distance from center / nearest rail transport stop / university  
The coefficient for distance from center is quite like the one in the whole country 
sample, though its effect is much weaker, which is likely to be explained by the 
fact that average distances within a single metropolitan area are much smaller than 
within the whole country. 
Distance from university on the other hand has a much higher significance than 
distance  from  city  center.  Though  somewhat  surprising,  as  one  would  expect  
students to push rents and thus yields up near universities, a likely explanation is 
that as two (Schools of Economy & Helsinki University) of the four major 
campuses in the HMA are in the city center, the effect captured by the distance 
from university variable is actually more telling of distance from center. 
The effect of distance from the neares rail transport stop (measured from subway 
and train stops) in the basic setup without area variables is somewhat unexpected: 
the closer the dwelling, the the higher the yield. This is in contradiction to most 
studies, which assume proximity to public transport to be a benefit, not a liability. 
However, as Laakso (1997) points out, many of these areas, especially in eastern 
Helsinki that are in the vicinity of subway stations, are deemed to be of low 
reputation. Consequently, the reason for the lower prices and rents is not the 
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availability of public transport itself, but other possible factors that the proximity 
captures. This explanation seems to be partially confirmed in the second setup, 
which includes area average income as a zip code specific variable. After 
controlling for income levels, the effect of distance to rail transport stop on net 
rental yield practically disappears, suggesting either that either this factor is 
correctly priced into both rents as well as prices, or more likely (supported also by 
Table 14 and Table 15), it does not have an economically significant effect on 
either price or rent. 
iii) Building age  
Similar effect as in whole country sample. 
iv) Row or single-family house (not apartment) / dwelling floor (top/in 
between/bottom)  
Row or single-family house has similar effect as in whole country sample. 
Bottom floor  has  similar  effect  as  in  whole  country  sample,  but  top  floor  has  no  
statistically significant effect. Examination of its effect on rent and price (Table 14 
and Table 15) shows it has no effect on those either, which could mean that in the 
Helsinki area, many dwellings on the top floor are in buildings without lifts. In the 
absence of a combined dummy (top floor and lift) it is not possible to get further 
insight into this. 
v) Rented or owned lot  
The dummy for rented lot is only slightly positive with very little statistical 
significance. This would suggest that the land leverage theory cannot explain the 
small variation that occurs within a single metropolitan area, but is rather suited to 
explain intrametropolitan variation. 
vi) Lift  
Similar effect as in whole country sample. 
vii) Average income in the area  
As mentioned before, the average income in the area has a very significantly 
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weakening effect on net rental yields. At the same time it takes away quite a lot of 
the negative effect of distance from center and the positive effect of distance from 
rail. Similarly as for the area unemployment in the whole country sample, a likely 
explanation would be that in areas where average income is low, people are credit 
constrained and thus forced to rent even at above market prices. However the 
effect of area average income is much higher, even though it is only within a 
single metropolitan area. Looking at Table 14 and Table 15, it can be seen that 
area average income has a positive effect on both rents and prices, but that the 
effect on prices is higher. Assuming that most people consider high average 
income a positive trait (possibly bringing with it better services, schools, etc.), this 
would suggest that homeowners are more concerned about the neighborhood 
characteristics than tenants. 
As in the HMA the areas with the highest average incomes are mostly not in the 
city center where the most expensive dwellings are, area average income is acts as 
more than a fixed effects control proxying for central location. Moreover, as 
dwelling price and average income do not always go hand in hand, the high 
significance of area average income suggests there may be more depth to the 
variation of rental yields than simple declining with dwelling price. 
viii) Median length of rent / sale advertisement in the area  
The median duration of an advertisement in the area has a slightly positive effect 
on net rental yield, but the effect is barely statistically significant. The variable 
was included as a proxy for vacancy, or inversely for liquidity. In the liquidity 
sense, it seems not to work very well, as lower liquidity should not decrease but 
increase rental yields. 
The effect of vacancy rates is not as straightforward. Although a high vacancy rate 
always decreases effective yield (which the data used in this study does not allow 
us  to  observe)  and  thus  requires  a  higher  rent  to  compensate,  a  lower  rent  may  
remedy the situation if the high vacancy rates are being caused by the tenants’ 
unwillingness to pay high asked rents.  
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Interestingly, looking at Table 14 and Table 15, one can note that the effects on 
rents and prices are much stronger than that on net rental yield, but that they cancel 
each other out for the most part. Somewhat surprisingly the effect is actually 
stronger for rents than for prices, which would suggest that vacancy rates are 
indeed being compensated for by higher rents. However, the possibility of reverse 
causality  should  be  noted  here  as  well.  As  the  data  used  is  on  ask  prices,  it  can  
simply be that dwellings whose ask price or rent is high take a longer time to sell 
or let out, or that in areas with higher average prices the decision making process 
of buying or renting a dwelling will on average take longer. 
ix) Turnover of dwelling type in the area  
Turnover of the dwelling type (apartment, rowhouse, single-family house) in the 
area has a negative effect on net rental yield. As a proxy for liquidity, it seems to 
function as expected: high turnover has a positive effect on both rents and prices 
(Table 14 and Table 15), but the effect on price is stronger, resulting in the 
negative effect on net rental yield. As in other asset markets, higher liquidity 
means lower transaction costs and thus lower liquidity premium, justifying a lower 
yield. 
x) Advertisement date  
Similar as in whole country sample. 
xi) Constant  
Similar as in whole country sample. 
 
5.5.3 Summary of signs and relative magnitudes of coefficients 
Table 12, Table 13, Table 14 and Table 15 in Appendix A show the results of the regression 
analyses  for  net  annual  rent  and  price  for  the  whole  country  sample  and  the  HMA  sample,  
respectively. As they are not the focus of this study, they act merely as a sanity check for the 
regression analyses with net rental yield as the dependent variable. Without comparing the 
analysis  of  rents  to  prices,  most  of  the  signs  of  the  regression  coefficients  for  either  one  
individually are as expected, and the ones that are not have been discussed in sections 5.5.1 
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and 5.5.2. Therefore the actual coefficients of those analyses are not discussed further. 
However, as it is through rent and price that net rental yield is formed, it is interesting to 
compare the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients. Table 9 presents a short summary of the 
key takeaways and possible explanations for the results of Table 12, Table 13, Table 14 and 
Table 15. 
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Table 9: 
Summary of signs and relative magnitudes of regression coefficients 
Table 9 summarizes key takeaways of the four regression analyses presented in Appendix A with brief 
interpretation. ++ means a relatively higher positive marginal effect, + a relatively lower positive marginal 
effect, - a relatively lower negative marginal effect and – a relatively higher negative marginal effect. 0 means 
that the effect is statistically insignificant. Elasticity effect as an explanation means that the coefficients for the 
particular variable have both had the expected sign but the magnitude of the coefficient for price has been 
greater. This is the case for quite many of the variables and stems from the finding that prices seem to be more 
elastic to both positive as well as negative attributes of the dwelling than rents. 
Variable Sample Rent Price Yield Key takeaway / possible explanations 
dwelling size Whole country + ++ - 
Elasticity effect. 
  HMA + ++ - 
distance from center Whole country - -- + 
Elasticity effect. 
  HMA - -- + 
distance from rail stop         
Corrected for area average income. Effect on price is 
negligible, while rent remains 
  HMA - 0 - 
distance from university Whole country - -- + 
Elasticity effect. 
  HMA - -- + 
built 1962-1983 Whole country - -- + 
Elasticity effect. 
  HMA - -- + 
built 1983-2009 Whole country + ++ - 
Elasticity effect. 
  HMA + ++ - 
not apartment Whole country ++ + + 
Elasticity effect. 
  HMA ++ + + 
bottom floor Whole country - -- + 
Elasticity effect. 
  HMA - -- + 
top floor Whole country - -- + 
Signs for rent and price surprising, possibly bias in 
data. In HMA having lift offsets top floor effect. 
  HMA 0 0 0 
lot is rented Whole country + 0 + 
Results for whole country in line (though weak) with 
land leverage proposition. In HMA canceling effects. 
  HMA + + 0 
building has lift Whole country ++ + + 
Possibly renters are more likely to be in need of lift 
(elders, handicappeds, etc.). HMA in line with NAC. 
  HMA + + 0 
town level unemployment Whole country 0 - + 
Buyers more interested in area income levels than 
renters, possibly due to longer investment horizon. 
          
area average income         
Elasticity effect. 
  HMA + ++ - 
area median ad period         
Causality may be reversed: higher rents and prices 
cause advertisement periods to grow longer. 
  HMA ++ + + 
area type turnover         
Liquidity in area increases prices but lowers required 
rate of return, so rents are not increased as much. 
  HMA + ++ - 
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5.5.4 Dummy regression for net rental yield in the HMA sample 
Despite the benefits of the double-log regression specification, the logarithmic functional 
form does make some limiting assumptions about the variables that enter the regression 
equation, such as that all values must be strictly positive. In addition to this, it may in some 
cases be reasonable to argue that the effects of all the continuous variables may not indeed be 
continuous, but that they exhibit jumps. These discontinuities and restrictions in mind, we 
have performed a regression analysis where all of the variables included are dummies. 
Dwelling size and distance from center in particular are variables whose effects may not be 
monotonous. For size, a good example is an increase in dwelling size over a threshold level 
that makes the dwelling large enough for one additional dweller may be valued differently 
than an increase that merely increases the spaciousness of the dwelling. Regarding distance 
from center, the same meter distance may in one case only mean a slightly longer commute 
while in another case, the need to start using either public trasnportation or an automobile 
instead of walking to the workplace.  
The greatest benefit of a dummy-only regression specification is that it makes the question of 
model  specification  redundant.  This  comes  at  the  cost  of  degrees  of  freedom and therefore,  
usability for smaller samples. In our case however, even the slightly smaller HMA sample of 
15129 observations easily suffices. The HMA sample is used because, as explained in section 
5.5.2, the presence of only one major CBD improves interpretability of the distance from 
center and the smaller variance of land values leaves less space for e.g. land leverage 
explaining the phenomenon. 
Altogether 69 additional dummy classes were created for this regression. Dwelling size is 
split into 41 dummy classes as follows: 5 square meter intervals up to 100 square meters, then 
10 square meter intervals up to 200 square meters and 20 square meter intervals from there 
onwards. The largest dwelling included was 390 square meters. Distance from center is split 
into 28 dummy classes, with 0.5 km intervals up to 5 kilometers, 1 km intervals from 5 
kilometers to 15 kilometers and 2 kilometer intervals from there onwards. The highest 
distance included was slightly under 30 kilomters. 
Table 10 shows the regression coefficients for the same dummy variables as in sections 5.5.1 
and 5.5.2, while the coefficients for the dwelling size dummy class are plotted in Figure 13 
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and the coefficients for the distance from center dummy class are shown in Figure 14. The 
coefficients along with their respective t-stats and the sizes of each dummy class are shown in 
Table 11. The same analysis was done for the whole country sample as well, but as its results 
do not differ greatly from those in the HMA sample, they are only shown in Appendix B 
(Table 16 and Figure 15). 
Table 10: 
Dummy regression: Net rental yield in the HMA sample 
Table 10 shows regression results for the HMA sample using the dummies-only regression specification. The 
dependent variable is net rental yield. All variables are split into dummy classes. As all coefficients except the 
floor dummies and the lot is rented dummy are significant at the 1 % level, asterisks marking significance have 
been left out. The effect of dwelling size is plotted in Figure 13, while the effect of distance from center is 
plotted in Figure 14. The coefficients, sizes and t-stats for both the dwelling size and distance from center 
dummy classes are shown in Table 11. The effect of advertisement date dummies (all significant at 1 % level 
except for 2008, which is expectedly close to the reference class 2009) is displayed in Figure 6. 
Variable n of dummy class Coefficient (t-stat in parentheses below the coefficient) 
dwelling size     Controlled   
          
distance from center     Controlled   
          
built 1962-1983 4604   0.018   
      (3.45)   
built 1983-2009 3263   -0.091   
      (-15.27)   
not apartment 1280   0.057   
      (7.16)   
bottom floor 1958   0.008   
      (1.72)   
top floor 2204   -0.008   
      (-1.68)   
lot is rented 275   0.005   
      (1.73)   
building has lift 2511   0.016   
      (2.77)   
advertisement date     Controlled   
          
constant     -4.102   
      (-17.12)   
Adjusted R-squared     0.397   
n     15129   
 
 
 
With the dummy-only regression specification, we are again able to offer further support to 
the hypothesis that net rental yield indeed is not constant but varies throughout the housing 
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market, even within a single metropolitan area. The adjusted R-squared of the dummy-only 
set-up is 0.397, the highest of any of the specifications. The individual coefficients are 
analyzed in the following list, but as the vast majority of the coefficients are alike to those in 
the earlier regressions, the focus will be on the differences between the results for the 
samples. 
i) Dwelling size  
As shown in Figure 13, the effect of larger dwelling size is quite consistently 
negative. The scale has been cut after the dummy class 110-120 m2, because the 
coefficients for dummy classes for sizes larger than that are not statistically 
significant even at the 10 % level, as shown in Table 11. The effect is strongest for 
the range of the scale, where relative increases are greatest. Overall this finding is 
quite well in line with the results of the double-log regressions. 
ii) Distance from center  
As shown in Figure 14, distance from center has a positive effect, but the effect is 
not as consistent as the one for dwelling size. Unlike the case of dwelling size, this 
inconsistency is not due to small amount of observations in the dummy classes 
(see Table 11), but more likely because of other location related variables in the 
HMA (smaller CBDs, coastline, etc.). 
iii) Building age  
Similar effect as in earlier regressions. 
iv) Row or single-family house (not apartment) / dwelling floor (top/in 
between/bottom)  
Whether the building is a row or single-family house has a similar effect as in 
earlier regressions. 
Being on the bottom floor has similar effect as in earlier regressions, although its 
significance is slightly lower. Top floor is actually slightly more significant than in 
the earlier regressions, but again, its economic significance is limited. 
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v) Rented or owned lot  
The dummy for rented lot is slightly positive but with even less statistical 
significance as in the HMA sample. This offers further support for the notion that 
the land leverage theory cannot explain the variation that occurs within a single 
metropolitan area, but is rather suited to explain intrametropolitan variation. 
vi) Lift  
Similar effect as in earlier regressions, though its coefficient is slightly more 
significant. 
vii) Constant  
Both the statistical significance as well as the coefficient for the constant are 
substantially smaller than they were in the double-log regressions. This is natural 
due to the greater amount of independent variables. 
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Figure 13: 
HMA sample: size of dwelling dummy value plot 
Figure 13 plots the effect of size of dwelling, calculated using dummies for the HMA sample. The solid line 
(scale on the left axis) shows the multiple with which net rental yield is multiplied for each dummy, while the 
dotted line (scale on the right axis) shows the net rental yield for an average dwelling (in terms of all the other 
parameters) in each class. Dummies with coefficients that are not significant at the 10 % level have been left out 
of the plot. 
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Figure 14: 
HMA sample: distance from center dummy value plot 
Figure 14 plots the effect of size of distance from center, calculated using dummies for the HMA sample. The 
solid line (scale on the left axis) shows the multiple with which net rental yield is multiplied for each dummy, 
while the dotted line (scale on the right axis) shows the net rental yield for an average dwelling (in terms of all 
the other parameters) in each class. 
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Table 11: 
Dwelling size and distance from center dummy data 
Table 11 shows the dummy specific counts, coefficients (converted to multipliers) and t-stats for the dwelling 
size and distance from center dummy classes in the dummy-only regression, for the HMA sample.  The four 
leftmost columns show the data for the dwelling size dummy class, while the four rightmost columns show data 
for the distance from center dummy class. The coefficients for the rest of the independent variables are shown in 
Table 10 and the ones plotted here are also shown plotted in Figure 13 (dwelling size) and Figure 14 (distance 
from center). 
Size class n Yield multiplier t-stat     Distance class n Yield multiplier t-stat 
0 - 10 m2 0 N/A N/A     0 - 0.5 km 233 0.88 2.78 
10 - 15 m2 8 1.52 4.80     0.5 - 1 km 1014 0.85 2.61 
15 - 20 m2 197 1.48 5.14     1 - 1.5 km 1727 0.82 2.44 
20 - 25 m2 871 1.40 4.73     1.5 - 2 km 1147 0.89 2.85 
25 - 30 m2 1335 1.30 4.23     2 - 2.5 km 1330 0.92 3.03 
30 - 35 m2 1087 1.23 3.83     2.5 - 3 km 471 0.92 3.02 
35 - 40 m2 912 1.17 3.43     3 - 3.5 km 597 0.92 3.03 
40 - 45 m2 1223 1.12 3.13     3.5 - 4 km 432 0.87 2.76 
45 - 50 m2 1524 1.08 2.85     4 - 4.5 km 370 0.86 2.72 
50 - 55 m2 1588 1.04 2.62     4.5 - 5 km 284 0.89 2.88 
55 - 60 m2 1318 1.03 2.50     5 - 6 km 641 0.96 3.24 
60 - 65 m2 704 1.01 2.38     6 - 7 km 490 1.00 3.47 
65 - 70 m2 604 0.98 2.19     7 - 8 km 537 0.99 3.42 
70 - 75 m2 739 0.97 2.11     8 - 9 km 722 1.03 3.63 
75 - 80 m2 671 0.96 2.01     9 - 10 km 563 1.04 3.68 
80 - 85 m2 383 0.95 1.91     10 - 11 km 610 1.05 3.73 
85 - 90 m2 290 0.96 1.98     11 - 12 km 824 1.04 3.67 
90 - 95 m2 268 0.94 1.87     12 - 13 km 929 1.08 3.88 
95 - 100 m2 250 0.95 1.94     13 - 14 km 407 1.11 3.98 
100 - 110 m2 284 0.95 1.93     14 - 15 km 401 1.04 3.67 
110 - 120 m2 236 0.91 1.64     15 - 17 km 775 1.07 3.83 
120 - 130 m2 170 0.90 1.53     17 - 19 km 338 1.14 4.13 
130 - 140 m2 117 0.87 1.32     19 - 21 km 121 1.07 3.78 
140 - 150 m2 81 0.89 1.47     21 - 23 km 149 1.22 4.45 
150 - 160 m2 52 0.90 1.49     23 + km 17 1.34 4.80 
160 - 170 m2 60 0.89 1.49             
170 - 180 m2 41 0.87 1.26             
180 - 190 m2 29 0.92 1.62             
190 - 200 m2 20 0.89 1.44             
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6 Discussion 
In this paper we presented an analysis of the cross-sectional variation of net rental yields in 
the Finnish housing market as well as of its determinants. To conduct the analysis we used a 
sample of data taken from individual for rent and for sale advertisements as well as other data 
sources. The data was described and analyzed through descriptive statistics as well as 
regression analyses. 
The motivation for this thesis was the hypothesis (based on individual observations and 
anecdotes) that rental yields are not stable across the housing market but fall as asset values 
increase. Though some earlier studies have documented similar findings, because of different 
focus areas, none of them have attempted to offer an explanation for the phenomenon. Further 
motivation was the relatively low amount of studies covering the housing market, especially 
in Finland, despite the large share that it represents of total investment assets in the economy. 
The results of our study suggest that there is, as hypothesized, discrepancies between how 
rents and prices are set, leading to variation in rental yield. In general, the variation can be 
divided into two dimensions, longitudinal as well as cross-sectional, both of which seem to 
occur. 
The main result of this study concerning cross-sectional variation is displayed in Figure 8. 
The observation is puzzling: net rental yield is a function of dwelling value, which falls as 
value increases. The economical significance of this is remarkable, as we find deviation of up 
to 4 % deviation between yields of the highest and lowest priced asset deciles in Table 5. This 
holds for dwellings of different types, sizes as well as geographies as shown by the regression 
analyses. Analyzing the determinants of net rental yield as well as price and rent separately in 
a hedonic model type regression, we find that differences in elasticities of rents and prices of 
the dwelling-specific characteristics explain most of the variation in yield. 
There are quite expectedly a large number of determinants affecting rents and prices. The 
most important ones are the size of the dwelling, the distance of the dwelling from the closest 
CBD or other services and the age of the structure, but issues such as on which floor of an 
apartment building the dwelling is located, whether or not there is an elevator and how many 
bedrooms the dwelling has also have an effect. Naturally, area-level issues such as average 
income, unemployment level and population growth also have an effect. Overall, in terms of 
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the above variables, it seems that the more attractive a dwelling is on average considered to 
be, the lower its expected rental yield, as it seems that tenants value dwelling attributes 
differently than owner occupiers.  
Because the primary focus of our study was cross-sectional variation, the data we gathered is 
not particularly suited to examine longitudinal variation. However, both literature as well as 
our analysis of a shorter period, support the notion that though rent development can drift 
apart from that of prices on the short run, the variation is mean-reverting on a medium to long 
term. More specifically, it seems that rents lag behind house price development, and 
therefore, an increase in dwelling prices translates into a short-term fall in rental yields (and 
vice versa), but in the long run, the longitudinal no-arbitrage condition seems to hold, 
especially considering long term interest rates. 
Concerning data, we find the usability of an advertisement dataset with our matching 
methodology good. A comparison between our data and data gathered by statistical institutes 
for  some  of  the  aggregate  level  analyses  suggests  that  our  dataset  is  rather  closely  
representative of the housing market as a whole. The actual study methodologies that we have 
chosen, especially double-log functional form in explaining the drivers of net rental yield 
variation, seem to work well for this kind of analysis. The possibility of separately regressing 
net rent as well as price and to intuitively combine those to obtain coefficients for net rental 
yield allows us to better understand the factors causing the variation. 
As mentioned earlier, a general explanation for the variation of both rents and prices is that 
rental tenants value dwelling attributes differently than owner occupiers. There can be many 
reasons for this, such as differences in investment horizon, cost of capital or the need to 
choose either one for other financial considerations such as taxation or subsidies. None of 
these however are sufficient from an investment perspective. If within one asset market with a 
fairly constant risk level, higher rental yield is attainable through better portfolio allocation, 
rational investors should reallocate until these abnormal yields cease to exist. 
The earlier studies that have documented this phenomenon have attributed the variation 
simply to unobservable terms such as expected appreciation or depreciation (maintenance), 
but considering the size of the spread and the fact that it exists even within a single 
metropolitan area, this attribution is unconvincing. Nevertheless, there are two attractive 
explanations that could explain the falling rental yields. However, after our analysis, they too 
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seem insufficient. Firstly, land leverage (Bostic et al., 2007), or the notion that assets with a 
higher share of land value built into them require a lower rate of return, was tested both by 
looking at an individual zip code and observing similar variation there, as well as using an 
owned / rented lot dummy in the regression, which was found to be economically 
insignificant. Secondly, the inframarginal landlord effect, proposed by Tian (2008), meaning 
that a large share of the higher value assets are not rented for purely economic reasons, is not 
consistent with the fact that similar variation exists even for the exact matched sample, where 
the same apartment is offered for sale and for rent and thus no emotional attachment to the 
dwelling should exist. 
The  final  explanation  that  is  left  would  be  transaction  costs:  for  the  same  euro  amount  
invested, investing in the low-value end of the housing market requires more transactions than 
investing in the high-value end and thus, after taking into account transaction costs, the 
adjusted net rental yields are no longer different. However, considering the magnitude of the 
variation, it seems highly unlikely that transaction costs could account for the whole spread 
between the two asset classes. 
After all of our failed attempts to explain the variation of rental yields in the housing market, 
we are left with an unexpected explanation: the housing market is inefficient, even in the 
weak form. Whether it is due to behavioral factors, the lack of capital to correct the situation, 
or simply the possibility that this variation has not been noticed by a sufficient amount of 
investors lies beyond the reach of this study, but as it is, there seems to be a possibility for 
investors in the housing market to achieve significantly better risk-adjusted returns simply 
through better portfolio allocation. 
A conclusion such as this has many implications. As at least on a short-to-medium term, but 
maybe even on a longer term, assets are inconsistently priced in regard to their cash flow 
producing capabilities, a large portion of investors, owner-occupiers as well as renters would 
benefit from exploiting the variation of net rental yields. High-value owner occupiers should 
consider selling their low-yielding dwellings, moving into renting and buying several low-
priced dwellings to pocket the spread, while tenants in low-value dwelling should attempt the 
opposite: move into owner-occupancy if it is financially possible. For investors, in addition to 
the better portfolio allocation potential, the geographical variation indicates that it is 
worthwhile to perform a holistic analysis of the entire country instead of focusing on one 
region. Policymakers should also draw conclusions, especially in terms of the way privately 
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owned housing in Finland is subsidized: at least at the moment, housing subsidies seem to 
support the rental market and drive higher rents while inflow of investment capital does not 
drive up the price level, causing investors in the low-value end to earn consistently high rental 
yields. 
The main contribution of this study to literature is to open up the topic of cross-sectional 
variation in the housing market for academic discussion. Though a few articles have indeed 
touched upon the subject, they have been limited to a view where, in our opinion, efficiency 
of the housing market has been too eagerly assumed. We feel that further discussion needs to 
take place with an emphasis on the investments point of view, to get better insight on the 
market efficiency issue. 
As our study is limited to one country only, it would be interesting to see future research take 
upon the challenge of performing this analysis in an international setting. It would be 
especially interesting to see whether countries with more developed privately financed rental 
markets still show the same tendency for rental yields to fall as asset values increase. 
Additionally, as owner-occupancy is such a highly preferred tenure choice and saving method 
in Finland, especially for higher income households, it would be interesting to see if this same 
phenomenon exists in other countries where the culture is similar. 
As  mentioned  earlier,  another  limitation  of  our  study  is  the  lack  of  data  on  which  
advertisements led to realized transactions, what the actual price was and whether one or both 
of the transaction counterparties was an institutional investor. Therefore an interesting follow-
up research could be conducted by linking the advertisements to the realized prices and seeing 
how the  rental  yields  are  affected  while  at  the  same time being  able  to  correct  for  vacancy  
rates. If it were further combined with data on the counterparties, more insight could be 
gained on the reasons behind the market inefficiency. Finally, as this data would have the 
benefit of reflecting real market conditions at a given moment, it could be used for other types 
of studies altogether, such as estimation of prices and rents using a hedonic model. 
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8 Appendices 
APPENDIX A: NET RENT AND DEBT-FREE ASK PRICE REGRESSION RESULTS  
Table 12: 
Whole country sample: annual net rent 
This table shows regression results for the whole country sample using a double-log regression specification, 
following equation (14). The dependent variable is annual net rent, and the coefficients in the first column 
include dependent variables without area specific continuous variables. The rows with a count (n of dummy) are 
dummy variables. The rightmost column includes town level unemployment, a zip code specific variable. As all 
coefficients except for the town level unemployment and building has lift dummies are significant at the 1 % 
level, asterisks marking significance have been left out. The effects of advertisement date dummies (all 
significant at 1 % level) and metropolitan area (all significant at 1 % level) are displayed in Figure 6 and Figure 
7 respectively and therefore marked controlled here. 
Variable n of dummy Coefficients (t-stat in parentheses below the coefficient) 
dwelling size   0.590   0.590   
    (191.69)   (191.52)   
distance from center   -0.070   -0.070   
    (-56.10)   (-55.95)   
distance from university   -0.066   -0.066   
    (-48.89)   (-48.81)   
built 1962-1983 10605 -0.097   -0.096   
    (-29.60)   (-29.22)   
built 1983-2009 7614 0.102   0.102   
    (27.42)   (27.36)   
not apartment 2828 0.151   0.151   
    (32.55)   (32.38)   
bottom floor 3829 -0.036   -0.036   
    (-10.46)   (-10.45)   
top floor 4152 -0.019   -0.019   
    (-5.64)   (-5.63)   
lot is rented 571 0.012   0.012   
    (3.56)   (3.55)   
building has lift 3422 0.018   0.018   
    (2.42)   (2.43)   
town level unemployment       0.009   
        (1.16)   
advertisement date   Controlled   Controlled   
            
metropolitan area   Controlled   Controlled   
            
constant   6.864   6.887   
    (555.02)   (289.31)   
Adjusted R-squared   0.796   0.796   
n   27719   27719   
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Table 13: 
Whole country sample: debt-free ask price 
This table shows regression results for the whole country sample using a double-log regression specification, 
following equation (14). The dependent variable is debt-free ask price, and the coefficients in the first column 
include dependent variables without area specific continuous variables. The rows with a count (n of dummy) are 
dummy variables. The rightmost column includes town level unemployment, a zip code specific variable. As all 
coefficients except for the lot is rented dummy and building has lift dummy are significant at the 1 % level, 
asterisks marking significance have been left out. The effects of advertisement date dummies (all significant at 1 
% level except for 2008, which is expectedly very close to the reference class 2009) and metropolitan area (all 
significant at 1 % level) are displayed in Figure 6 and Figure 7 respectively and therefore marked controlled 
here. 
Variable n of dummy class Coefficients (t-stat in parentheses below the coefficient) 
dwelling size   0.855   0.854   
    (236.77)   (236.34)   
distance from center   -0.104   -0.104   
    (-70.53)   (-70.71)   
distance from university   -0.100   -0.100   
    (-63.20)   (-63.36)   
built 1962-1983 10605 -0.161   -0.163   
    (-41.92)   (-42.21)   
built 1983-2009 7614 0.206   0.204   
    (47.47)   (46.53)   
not apartment 2828 0.036   0.032   
    (6.64)   (5.90)   
bottom floor 3829 -0.055   -0.055   
    (-13.46)   (-13.51)   
top floor 4152 -0.027   -0.027   
    (-6.81)   (-6.84)   
lot is rented 571 -0.006   -0.005   
    (-0.96)   (-0.93)   
building has lift 3422 0.005   0.004   
    (2.13)   (2.16)   
town level unemployment       -0.042   
        (-4.78)   
advertisement date   Controlled   Controlled   
            
metropolitan area   Controlled   Controlled   
            
constant   9.005   8.891   
    (620.57)   (318.42)   
Adjusted R-squared   0.844   0.844   
n   27719   27719   
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Table 14: 
HMA sample: annual net rent 
This table shows regression results for the HMA sample using a double-log regression specification, following 
equation (14). The dependent variable is annual net rent, and the coefficients in the first column include 
dependent variables without area specific continuous variables. The rows with a count (n of dummy) are dummy 
variables. The three rightmost columns include area specific variables. As all coefficients except top floor 
dummy and three lift coefficients are significant at the 1 % level, asterisks marking significance have been left 
out. The effect of advertisement date dummies (all significant at 1 % level except for 2008, which is expectedly 
close to the reference class 2009) are displayed in Figure 6 and therefore marked controlled here. 
Variable n of dummy Coefficients (t-stat in parentheses below the coefficient) 
dwelling size   0.604 0.590 0.573 0.606 
    (153.31) (154.06) (114.79) (154.47) 
distance from center   -0.035 -0.024 -0.034 -0.032 
    (-18.50) (-13.35) (-18.27) (-17.37) 
distance from rail stop   0.018 -0.009 0.015 0.015 
    (10.11) (-4.56) (8.16) (8.49) 
distance from university   -0.113 -0.097 -0.111 -0.111 
    (-40.62) (-35.66) (-40.02) (-40.08) 
built 1962-1983 4604 -0.094 -0.091 -0.097 -0.092 
    (-20.46) (-20.52) (-21.14) (-20.09) 
built 1983-2009 3263 0.089 0.090 0.085 0.086 
    (16.62) (17.44) (15.92) (16.20) 
not apartment 1280 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.149 
    (28.22) (29.30) (28.32) (18.47) 
bottom floor 1958 -0.025 -0.027 -0.025 -0.024 
    (-5.05) (-5.71) (-5.17) (-4.95) 
top floor 2204 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 
    (-0.89) (-0.59) (-1.03) (-0.67) 
lot is rented 275 0.018 0.016 0.020 0.019 
    (3.91) (3.90) (4.07) (4.02) 
building has lift 2511  0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 
    (2.04) (2.64) (2.11) (1.96) 
area average income     0.190     
      (32.90)     
area median ad period       0.056   
        (10.17)   
area type turnover         0.044 
          (12.20) 
advertisement date   Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
            
constant   6.818 6.191 6.817 6.897 
    (428.15) (252.90) (429.56) (402.84) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.775 0.790 0.777 0.777 
n   15129 15129 15129 15129 
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Table 15: 
HMA sample: debt-free ask price 
This table shows regression results for the HMA sample using a double-log regression specification, following 
equation (14). The dependent variable is annual net rent, and the coefficients in the first column include 
dependent variables without area specific continuous variables. The rows with a count (n of dummy) are dummy 
variables. The three rightmost columns include area specific variables. As all coefficients except top floor 
dummy, lot is rented dummy and lift dummy are significant at the 1 % level, asterisks marking significance have 
been left out. The effect of advertisement date dummies (all significant at 1 % level except for 2008, which is 
expectedly close to the reference class 2009) are displayed in Figure 6 and therefore marked controlled here. 
Variable n of dummy Coefficients (t-stat in parentheses below the coefficient) 
dwelling size   0.864 0.842 0.841 0.868 
    (216.49) (230.44) (166.11) (220.48) 
distance from center   -0.045 -0.029 -0.045 -0.042 
    (-24.04) (-16.59) (-23.86) (-22.30) 
distance from rail stop   0.043 0.000 0.040 0.038 
    (24.10) (-0.07) (22.42) (21.48) 
distance from university   -0.181 -0.156 -0.180 -0.178 
    (-64.23) (-59.72) (-63.73) (-63.91) 
built 1962-1983 4604 -0.142 -0.137 -0.144 -0.138 
    (-30.48) (-32.40) (-30.94) (-30.13) 
built 1983-2009 3263 0.149 0.151 0.146 0.144 
    (27.49) (30.65) (26.95) (27.03) 
not apartment 1280 0.055 0.056 0.055 -0.031 
    (7.80) (8.73) (7.82) (-3.79) 
bottom floor 1958 -0.037 -0.041 -0.037 -0.036 
    (-7.46) (-9.04) (-7.55) (-7.37) 
top floor 2204 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003 
    (0.32) (0.91) (0.22) (0.71) 
lot is rented 275 0.017 0.014 0.018 0.019 
    (1.91) (1.85) (2.02) (2.10) 
building has lift 2511 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000 
    (0.56) (0.30) (0.51) (0.71) 
area average income     0.311     
      (56.40)     
area median ad period       0.042   
        (7.38)   
area type turnover         0.078 
          (21.32) 
advertisement date   Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
            
constant   8.981 7.957 8.981 9.120 
    (556.57) (340.91) (557.53) (530.89) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.864 0.887 0.864 0.868 
n   15129 15129 15129 15129 
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APPENDIX B: WHOLE COUNTRY SAMPLE REGRESSION WITH SIZE AS DUMMIES 
Table 16: 
Dummy regression: Net rental yield in the Whole country sample 
Table 16 shows regression results for the whole sample using the dummies-only regression specification. The 
dependent variable is net rental yield. All variables are split into dummy classes. As all coefficients except the 
top floor dummy are significant at the 1 % level, asterisks marking significance have been left out. The effect of 
dwelling size is plotted in Figure 15. The coefficients, sizes and t-stats for the dwelling size dummy class are 
omitted, but their magnitudes, as shown in Figure 15 are quite similar as in Table 11 for the HMA sample. The 
effect of advertisement date dummies (all significant at 1 % level except for 2008, which is expectedly close to 
the reference class 2009) is displayed in Figure 6. 
Variable n of dummy class Coefficient (t-stat in parentheses below the coefficient) 
distance from center     0.035   
      (25.04)   
distance from university     0.034   
      (23.12)   
built 1962-1983 10605   0.066   
      (18.14)   
built 1983-2009 7614   -0.099   
      (-24.23)   
not apartment 2828   0.087   
      (15.61)   
bottom floor 3829   0.020   
      (5.11)   
top floor 4152   0.009   
      (2.45)   
lot is rented 571   0.016   
      (3.89)   
building has lift 3422   0.013   
      (4.40)   
advertisement date     Controlled   
          
metropolitan area     Controlled   
          
constant     -3.794   
      (-18.01)   
Adjusted R-squared     0.380   
n     27719   
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Figure 15: 
Whole country sample: size of dwelling dummy value plot 
Figure 15 plots the effect of size of dwelling, calculated using dummies for the whole country sample. The solid 
line (scale on the left axis) shows the multiple with which net rental yield is multiplied for each dummy, while 
the dotted line (scale on the right axis) shows the net rental yield for an average dwelling (in terms of all the 
other parameters) in each class. Dummies with coefficients that are not significant at the 10 % level have been 
left out of the plot. 
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APPENDIX C: CORRELATION TABLES 
Table 17: 
Correlation table for the whole country sample 
Whole country sample built 1962-1983 
built 1983-
2009 
not 
apartment bottom floor top floor 
distance 
from center 
distance 
from 
university 
dwelling 
size 
town level 
unemployment 
net annual 
rent sales price 
net rental 
yield lot is rented 
built 1983-2009 -0.4844 1                       
not apartment -0.1231 0.3528 1                     
bottom floor 0.0484 -0.0259 -0.1349 1                   
top floor 0.0665 -0.0853 -0.1415 -0.168 1                 
distance from center 0.2644 0.1534 0.1691 0.0621 0.048 1               
distance from university 0.2747 0.166 0.1836 0.052 0.0413 0.7933 1             
dwelling size -0.0015 0.306 0.4349 -0.0644 -0.042 0.1343 0.1403 1           
town level unemployment 0.0625 0.0164 -0.1415 0.0303 0.0232 0.0857 0.1074 -0.0489 1         
net annual rent -0.3526 0.261 0.3516 -0.1181 -0.079 -0.2637 -0.2853 0.5976 -0.4026 1       
sales price -0.4016 0.298 0.2922 -0.1183 -0.0768 -0.3186 -0.341 0.6158 -0.3772 0.8973 1     
net rental yield 0.2977 -0.2218 -0.0652 0.0651 0.0387 0.2616 0.275 -0.366 0.1658 -0.3272 -0.7107 1   
lot is rented 0.0113 0.0228 0.0367 -0.0073 -0.0018 0.0343 0.0414 0.0267 0.0077 0.0196 0.0025 0.0258 1 
building has lift -0.0075 -0.0396 -0.0888 -0.0444 -0.0377 -0.0319 -0.0371 -0.0673 -0.114 0.013 -0.0061 0.0338 0.0853 
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Table 18: 
Correlation table for the HMA sample 
HMA sample 
built 
1962-
1983 
built 
1983-
2009 
not 
apartment 
bottom 
floor top floor 
distance 
from 
center 
distance 
from rail 
stop 
distance 
from 
university 
dwelling 
size 
area 
average 
income 
area type 
turnover 
area 
median 
ad period 
net 
annual 
rent 
sales 
price 
net rental 
yield 
lot is 
rented 
built 1983-2009 -0.3468 1                             
not apartment -0.0416 0.3707 1                           
bottom floor 0.0463 -0.027 -0.1172 1                         
top floor 0.0404 -0.0803 -0.1255 -0.1592 1                       
distance from center 0.3325 0.2931 0.2479 0.0533 0.0146 1                     
distance from rail stop 0.1011 0.1029 0.2214 0.0386 -0.0286 0.269 1                   
distance from university 0.3893 0.3462 0.282 0.0589 0.0163 0.7653 0.2038 1                 
dwelling size 0.0368 0.3377 0.4675 -0.0731 -0.0416 0.1692 0.2003 0.1677 1               
area average income -0.1477 -0.0764 0.009 -0.0057 -0.0343 -0.301 0.3229 -0.3376 0.1072 1             
area type turnover -0.1415 0.2067 0.5459 -0.0809 -0.0969 -0.0174 0.1821 0.0049 0.2258 0.3072 1           
area median ad period 0.0346 0.248 0.3296 -0.042 -0.0274 0.098 0.258 0.0843 0.6921 0.1981 0.1765 1         
net annual rent -0.259 0.3114 0.4248 -0.1104 -0.0646 -0.1598 0.1295 -0.1972 0.7569 0.3267 0.3222 0.5707 1       
sales price -0.3007 0.3086 0.3506 -0.1107 -0.0525 -0.2124 0.1428 -0.2699 0.7807 0.3932 0.3054 0.5811 0.8906 1     
net rental yield 0.2159 -0.1471 -0.0515 0.055 0.0061 0.19 -0.0919 0.2512 -0.4228 -0.3019 -0.1228 -0.303 -0.2596 -0.6702 1   
lot is rented 0.0079 0.0417 0.0386 0.0021 0.0027 0.0264 0.0035 0.0324 0.0275 -0.0085 0.0117 0.0074 0.0363 0.0221 0.0125 1 
building has lift 0.0015 -0.0119 -0.1024 -0.0529 -0.0493 -0.0566 -0.0363 -0.0498 -0.0665 -0.0032 -0.0347 -0.0513 -0.0794 -0.085 0.0509 0.0856 
 
 
 
 
